

## **Oral Hearing**

**Day 6 – Tuesday, 8th November 2022**

**Being heard before: Ms Christine Smith KC (Chair)**  
**Dr Sonia Swart (Panel Member)**  
**Mr Damian Hanbury (Assessor)**

**Held at: Bradford Court, Belfast**

Gwen Malone Stenography Services certify the following to be a verbatim transcript of their stenographic notes in the above-named action.

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**Gwen Malone Stenography Services**

1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON TUESDAY, 8TH NOVEMBER 2022 AS  
2 FOLLOWS:

3  
4 CHAIR: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome  
5 to the first public hearing of the Urology Services 10:29  
6 Inquiry. At the outset I would like to introduce  
7 myself and my colleagues who are here today. My name  
8 is Christine Smith KC. I am a senior counsel at the  
9 Bar of Northern Ireland where I have been in  
10 independent practice as a barrister since 1985. I am 10:30  
11 experienced in Inquiry work and in March 2021 I was  
12 appointed by the Minister for Health to lead this  
13 Inquiry.

14  
15 My principal function is to ensure that the Inquiry 10:30  
16 fulfills its Terms of Reference which are set out on  
17 our website. I'm also the person who makes all the  
18 decisions about how the Inquiry is run and will rule on  
19 all applications and requests made to the Inquiry.

20 10:30  
21 To my right is Dr. Sonia Swart who is my co-panelist.  
22 Dr. Swart is a former consultant in clinical  
23 haematology. She practised in her field as a  
24 consultant for over 25 years before moving into medical  
25 leadership and management roles. She became Medical 10:30  
26 Director and then Chief Executive officer of  
27 Northampton General Hospital. She is eminently  
28 qualified to advise the Inquiry on the issues of  
29 governance with which it is primarily concerned.

1 To my left is Mr. Damian Hanbury, assessor to the  
2 Inquiry. Mr. Hanbury is a consultant urologist at the  
3 Lister Hospital in Hertfordshire. He has many years  
4 experience of working as a consultant in clinical  
5 urology. He is currently Honorary Visiting Senior 10:31  
6 Lecturer at the University of Hertfordshire and is a  
7 college assessor for the Royal College of Surgeons.  
8 Mr. Hanbury advises the Inquiry on the clinical aspects  
9 of the cases we are looking at so that the Inquiry can  
10 better understand the issues it is tasked with 10:31  
11 considering.

12  
13 Neither Dr. Swart nor Mr. Hanbury has worked in  
14 Northern Ireland previously and they have no connection  
15 to any of the Core Participants. 10:31

16  
17 Also present today are Martin Wolfe KC, counsel to the  
18 Inquiry, who will deliver his formal opening statement  
19 shortly outlining the issues that the Inquiry is tasked  
20 with considering and indicating some of what the 10:31  
21 initial evidence appears to show.

22  
23 Laura McMahon, junior counsel to the Inquiry, is also  
24 present and both Mr. Wolfe and Ms. McMahon will be  
25 questioning the witnesses who come to speak to us. 10:32  
26

27 Ann Donnelly, solicitor to the Inquiry, who together  
28 with Mr. Wolfe heads up the legal team comprising  
29 Shauna Benson and Eoin Murphy, our deputy Inquiry

1 solicitors, Dr. Leah Treanor, Mr. Andrew Beech,  
2 Ms. Niamh Horscroft and Ms. Lara Smyth, our junior  
3 barristers.

4  
5 Fiona Marshall, the Inquiry Secretary, heads up the 10:32  
6 secretariat team of six, three of whom, led by her  
7 deputy, Mrs. Eileen Casey, are engaged full-time on  
8 information management for the Inquiry.

9  
10 Inquiries are set up to investigate matters of concern 10:32  
11 to the public. They are set up to examine the  
12 evidence, establish the facts, find out if things went  
13 wrong, if so, why they did go wrong and what lessons  
14 can be learned so that mistakes are not repeated. This  
15 Inquiry is no different. It was set up by Minister for 10:33  
16 Health Mr. Swann to examine the matters of concern that  
17 were raised regarding the treatment of patients within  
18 the Southern Trust that resulted in patients being  
19 harmed.

20 10:33  
21 You will hear the Terms of Reference set out in full  
22 later by Mr. Wolfe but to put things in very simple  
23 terms, it is the task of the Inquiry to find out what  
24 happened in relation to the care of patients within the  
25 Urology Department of the Southern Health and Social 10:33  
26 Care Trust; what were the systems that allowed that to  
27 happen? Did the systems in place to prevent it  
28 happening work? If not, why not? And to make  
29 recommendations to try to avoid it happening again.

1 One of my first tasks as Inquiry Chair was to designate  
2 the Core Participants to the Inquiry. In considering  
3 who ought to be a Core Participant, I took several  
4 things into account and although not bound by the  
5 Inquiry Rules 2006, I had regard to Rule 5 of those 10:34  
6 rules in arriving at my decision. I determined that  
7 each of the three Core Participants before the Inquiry  
8 played or may have played a direct and significant role  
9 in relation to the matters to which the Inquiry  
10 relates, has a significant interest in an important 10:34  
11 aspect of the matters to which the Inquiry relates, or  
12 may be subject to explicit or significant criticism  
13 during the Inquiry proceedings or in the report or in  
14 any interim report.

15  
16 Accordingly, the three Core Participants before the 10:34  
17 Inquiry are the Southern Health and Social Care Trust,  
18 the Department of Health, and Mr. Aidan O'Brien. The  
19 legal representatives of each Core Participant are here  
20 today and I invite them now to publicly announce their 10:35  
21 appearances and if I could bring first of all with the  
22 representatives for the Trust.

23  
24 NO AUDIO COMING THROUGH

25  
26 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Lunny. The representative for  
27 Mr. O'Brien please?

28  
29 NO AUDIO COMING THROUGH

1 CHAIR: Finally the Department of Health.

2  
3 NO CLEAR AUDIO COMING THROUGH

4  
5 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Reid.

10:36

6  
7 From the start of our work, the Inquiry has been  
8 conscious of the fact that it was due to issues  
9 concerning the care of patients that the Minister for  
10 Health announced this Inquiry on 24th November 2020.  
11 Patients and families, some of whom sadly lost their  
12 lives, are at the heart of the work of this Inquiry and  
13 the Inquiry acknowledges the pain and suffering that  
14 they have sustained.

10:37

15  
16 From my appointment in March '21 it was my intention to  
17 commence to hear from witnesses as soon as we could and  
18 to hear first from patients and families. Term D of  
19 the Inquiry's Terms of Reference tasks the Inquiry with  
20 affording patients and families an opportunity to tell  
21 us of their experiences and about the impact of those  
22 experiences on them.

10:37

23  
24 I have, to date, personally written to 75 former Trust  
25 patients or their immediate family members inviting  
26 them to engage with the Inquiry, and I and my panel  
27 member and assessor are very grateful to those  
28 individuals and/or their legal representatives who took  
29 time to fill in questionnaires and provide us with

10:37

1 material.

2  
3 In June and September the Inquiry held private hearings  
4 to allow some patients and families to relate their  
5 experiences to us. The public was not permitted access 10:38  
6 to those hearings but I arranged that suitably redacted  
7 transcripts of those hearings were published on the  
8 Inquiry's website. I'm very grateful to those who did  
9 come and speak to us and relate their own experiences  
10 or those of their loved ones. We found hearing 10:38  
11 directly from them about their experiences both moving  
12 and extremely helpful, and I would again encourage  
13 anyone who wishes us to know about their experiences to  
14 contact us. The Inquiry will continue to hold private  
15 hearings in the course of its work until we conclude 10:39  
16 our hearings.

17  
18 Today, however, marks a start of a different stage of  
19 our work --

20 MR. WOLFE KC: Chairman, I have been just passed a note 10:39  
21 to indicate that there is no sound online streaming.  
22 It was suggested to me that we wait until the end but I  
23 think it is important that your opening statement  
24 should be heard.

25 CHAIR: Very well. If I can just check with our 10:39  
26 communications staff if that can be rectified quickly?  
27 We can just then pause for a moment until we -- and if  
28 you could give me an indication as to when it is  
29 operational please.





1 haematology. She practised in her field as a  
2 consultant for over 25 years before moving into medical  
3 leadership and management roles. She became Medical  
4 Director and then Chief Executive Officer of  
5 Northampton General Hospital. She is eminently 11:36  
6 qualified to advise the Inquiry on the issues of  
7 governance with which it is primarily concerned.

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9 To my left is Mr. Damian Hanbury, assessor to the  
10 Inquiry. Mr. Hanbury is a consultant urologist in 11:36  
11 Lister Hospital in Hertfordshire. He has many years  
12 experience of working as a consultant in clinical  
13 urology. He is currently Honorary Visiting Senior  
14 Lecturer at the University of Hertfordshire and is a  
15 college assessor for the Royal College of Surgeons. 11:37  
16 Mr. Hanbury advises the Inquiry on the clinical aspects  
17 of the cases we are looking at so that the Inquiry can  
18 better understand the issues it is tasked with  
19 considering.

20 11:37  
21 Neither Dr. Swart nor Mr. Hanbury has worked in  
22 Northern Ireland and they have no connection to any of  
23 the Core Participants.

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25 Also present today are Martin Wolfe KC, counsel to the 11:37  
26 Inquiry, who will deliver his formal opening statement  
27 shortly, outlining the issues that the Inquiry is  
28 tasked with considering and indicating some of what the  
29 initial evidence appears to show.

1 His junior counsel is Ms. Laura McMahon and both  
2 Mr. Wolfe and Ms. McMahon will be questioning the  
3 witnesses who come to speak to us.  
4

5 Ann Donnelly, solicitor to the Inquiry, who together 11:37  
6 with Mr. Wolfe, heads up the Inquiry's legal team  
7 comprising Shauna Benson and Eoin Murphy, our deputy  
8 Inquiry solicitors, Dr. Leah Treanor, Mr. Andrew Beech,  
9 Ms. Niamh Horscroft and Ms. Lara Smyth, our junior  
10 barristers. 11:38

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12 Fiona Marshall, the Inquiry Secretary, heads up a  
13 secretariat team of six, three of whom, led by her  
14 deputy, Mrs. Eileen Casey, are engaged full-time on  
15 information management for the Inquiry. 11:38

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17 Inquiries are set up to investigate matters of concern  
18 to the public. They are set up to examine the  
19 evidence, establish the facts, find out if things went  
20 wrong; if so, why did they go wrong and what lessons 11:38  
21 can be learned so that mistakes are not repeated.  
22

23 This Inquiry is no different. It was set up by  
24 Minister of Health, Mr. Swann, to examine the matters  
25 of concern that were raised regarding the treatment of 11:38  
26 patients within the Southern Trust that resulted in  
27 patients being harmed. You will hear the Terms of  
28 Reference set out in full later by Mr. Wolfe but to put  
29 things in very simple terms, it is the task of the

1 Inquiry to find out what happened in relation to the  
2 care of patients within the Urology Department in the  
3 Southern Health and Social Care Trust; what were the  
4 systems that allowed that to happen?; did the systems  
5 in place to prevent it happening work?; if not, why 11:39  
6 not?; and to make recommendations to try to avoid it  
7 happening again.

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9 One of my first tasks as Inquiry Chair was to designate  
10 the Core Participants to the Inquiry. In considering 11:39  
11 who ought to be a Core Participant, I took several  
12 factors into account and although not bound by the  
13 Inquiry's Rules 2005, I had regard to Rule 5 of those  
14 rules in arriving at my decision. I determined that  
15 each of the three Core Participants before the Inquiry 11:39  
16 played or may have played a direct and significant role  
17 in relation to the matters to which the Inquiry  
18 relates, has a significant interest in an important  
19 aspect of the matters to which the Inquiry relates, or  
20 may be subject to explicit or significant criticism 11:40  
21 during the Inquiry proceedings or in the report or in  
22 any interim report.

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24 Accordingly, the three Core Participants before the  
25 Inquiry are: The Southern Health and Social Care 11:40  
26 Trust, the Department of Health, and Mr. Aidan O'Brien.  
27 The legal representatives of each Core Participant are  
28 present here today and I invite them now to publicly  
29 announce their appearances and may I ask that each of

1 you speak as loudly and clearly as you can because  
2 there have been some sound issues today. So if I could  
3 call first upon the representative for the Southern  
4 Health and Social Care Trust.

5 MR. LUNNY KC: Chair, Dr. Swart, Mr. Hanbury, my name  
6 is Donal Lunny. I'm instructed on behalf of the  
7 Southern Health and Social Care Trust, I'm instructed  
8 along with fellow counsel, (inaudible) Elizabeth  
9 Ferguson and Sam Madden BL. We are instructed by the  
10 Directorate of Legal Services, Avril Frizell and Emmet  
11 Fox. With me here in the Chamber today I have Avril  
12 Frizell. I should also say that I have present in the  
13 chamber from the Southern Health and Social Care Trust,  
14 the Chief Executive, Dr. Maria O'Kane. Thank you,  
15 Chair.

16 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Lunny. Then if the  
17 representative for Mr. O'Brien would announce the  
18 appearance please.

19 MR. BOYLE KC: Good morning, Chair, Dr. Swart,  
20 Mr. Hanbury. My name is Gerry Boyle KC and together  
21 with my friend, Mr. Robert Millar, Counsel, we appear  
22 on behalf of Mr. O'Brien. We are instructed by  
23 Tughans Solicitors, by Mr. Andrew Anthony, Kevin  
24 Hegarty, Aimee Crilly. Mr. O'Brien is present before  
25 you sitting in the Public Gallery.

26 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Boyle. Then for the Department  
27 of Health, please.

28 MR. REID: Good morning, Dr. Swart, Mr. Hanbury, my  
29 name is David Reid, Counsel. Sarah Wilson is present

1 from The Departmental Solicitors' Office. Mr. Robbie  
2 Davis from the Department of Health is also present.

3 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Reid.  
4

5 From the start of our work, the Inquiry has been 11:43  
6 conscious of the fact that it was due to issues  
7 concerning the care of patients that the Minister for  
8 Health announced this Inquiry on 24th November 2020.  
9 Patients and families, some of whom sadly lost their  
10 lives are at the heart of the work that the Inquiry is 11:43  
11 undertaking and the Inquiry acknowledges their pain and  
12 suffering.

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14 From my appointment in March 2021, it was my intention  
15 to commence to hear from witnesses as soon as we could 11:43  
16 and to hear first from patients and families. Term D  
17 of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference tasks the Inquiry  
18 with affording patients and families an opportunity to  
19 tell us of their experiences and about the impact those  
20 experiences had on them. 11:43

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22 I have, to date, written personally to 75 former Trust  
23 patients or their immediate family members, inviting  
24 them to engage with the Inquiry. I'm very grateful to  
25 those individuals and/or their legal representatives 11:44  
26 who took the time to fill in questionnaires and provide  
27 us with material.

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29 In June and September the Inquiry held private hearings

1 to allow some patients and families to relate their  
2 experiences to us. The public were not permitted  
3 access to those hearings but I arranged that suitably  
4 redacted transcripts of the hearings were published on  
5 the Inquiry website. I'm very grateful for those who 11:44  
6 did come to speak to us and relate their own  
7 experiences or those of their loved ones.

8  
9 We found hearing directly from them about their  
10 experiences was both moving and extremely helpful and I 11:44  
11 would, again, encourage anyone who wishes us to know  
12 about their experiences to contact us.

13  
14 The Inquiry will continue to hold private hearings in  
15 the course of its work until we conclude our hearings. 11:45  
16

17 Today, however, marks the start of a different stage of  
18 our work. Over the coming months, aside from those  
19 days when we sit again in private to hear from patients  
20 and families, the hearings will be live-streamed to the 11:45  
21 public from the Inquiry's website. All evidence will  
22 be recorded, transcribed and placed on the Inquiry's  
23 website as soon as practicable after it is heard to  
24 enable many of the people that are interested in our  
25 work to follow our proceedings without the need to 11:45  
26 attend in person. Our hearing chamber is small and  
27 provision for the public to attend and view the  
28 proceedings in person is limited. In total we can  
29 accommodate only 15 people in person in the public

1 gallery. I have made provision for an overflow room to  
2 accommodate members of the media. Proceedings in the  
3 chamber will be live-streamed to that room on a large  
4 screen.

5 As well as the transcripts of evidence, documents  
6 referred to in the course of the evidence will also be  
7 placed on the website, together with the response  
8 statements of the witnesses in full. Many of the

9 documents called up in the chamber, statements and

10 attachments will require redaction before they can be

11 placed on the website. Redaction is a major exercise

12 and there is likely to be a time lapse between a

13 witness giving evidence and the statement appearing on

14 the website. I would remind everyone that material

15 shown in the chamber is subject to Restriction Order

16 No. 2 of 2022, and any information displayed on the

17 screens in the chamber which could identify people must

18 not be disclosed.

19  
20 The Restriction Order can be found on the website and

21 the Inquiry's website includes a number of documents

22 relating to our procedures and protocols and I would

23 refer you to those.

24  
25 In June, when opening our private hearings, I made some

26 comments about the nature of our work that bear

27 repeating as we start our public hearings.

28  
29 An inquiry is not a trial. The process is entirely

1 inquisitorial in nature. It is designed to uncover  
2 facts from which Dr. Swart and I can reach conclusions  
3 and then make recommendations to the Minister. The  
4 Inquiries Act 2005 under which we work expressly  
5 prevents us from making any finding of criminal or 11:47  
6 civil liability. That means that our findings will not  
7 have the legal effect of convicting any individual of a  
8 crime, nor will it have the legal effect of ordering  
9 any individual or body to pay compensation.

10  
11 It is important to state clearly that Mr. O'Brien is  
12 one of the Core Participants before the Inquiry as it  
13 was cases involving his former patients that led to  
14 this Inquiry being set up. But I must stress that this  
15 is not an inquiry purely into the clinical practice of 11:48  
16 Mr. O'Brien; we are, however, looking at the clinical  
17 aspects of certain cases with a view to fulfilling  
18 paragraph (c) of our Terms of Reference. That Term of  
19 Reference tasks us with looking at the clinical aspects  
20 of cases for the purpose of providing a report about 11:48  
21 governance within the Trust. It is not the purpose of  
22 this Inquiry to re-examine patients to assess their  
23 treatment. The Trust is engaged in a lookback review  
24 of patients. The Royal College of Surgeons reported on  
25 a sample of Mr. O'Brien's cases and issues regarding 11:48  
26 his fitness to practise are matters for the General  
27 Medical Council. Any civil liability is a matter for  
28 the Courts.  
29



1 while Mr. O'Brien's clinical practice has been a  
2 catalyst for this Inquiry, it is not the primary focus  
3 of our work, which relates to clinical and corporate  
4 governance within the Southern Health and Social Care  
5 Trust.

11:49

6  
7 From when the Inquiry commenced its work in September  
8 2001 (sic), in addition to contacting patients, I have  
9 issued a number of notices under Section 21 of the  
10 Inquiries Act 2005 seeking documents and witness  
11 statements. Questionnaires have been sent to staff and  
12 former staff who were involved in the Urology  
13 Department at the relevant time. Some of those staff  
14 members have also received Section 21 notices. Where I  
15 considered it appropriate to do so, I have granted  
16 extensions to the time permitted for responses to  
17 notices.

11:49

11:49

18  
19 To date that work has generated substantial documentary  
20 material amounting to almost 400,000 pages of evidence,  
21 including 91 witness response statements, the shortest  
22 of which is ten pages and the lengthiest 9,555,  
23 including appendices.

11:50

24  
25 In addition, we received 133 completed questionnaires  
26 from staff and 16 from patients or family members.  
27 There are still more responses to come in and more  
28 notices to issue.

11:50

1 Unfortunately I need to state publicly that the manner  
2 in which much of that material was provided to the  
3 Inquiry was far from satisfactory and caused much  
4 unnecessary work for the Inquiry's small, committed  
5 secretariat. Material was not properly ordered, 11:50  
6 indexed or accessible. Some material was not provided  
7 at all and some material was shared with the Inquiry  
8 that ought not to have been. I found it extremely  
9 surprising to have received material in such a poor  
10 state from a government department and Health Trust 11:51  
11 both of whom have dedicated legal teams and for this  
12 standard provision of material to have been allowed to  
13 continue when the Inquiry made it abundantly clear what  
14 was expected.

15  
16 Once ordered and placed in the appropriate evidence  
17 bundles, the material has been scrutinised by the  
18 Inquiry legal team. Analysis of the material has  
19 frequently led the Inquiry to seek further material for  
20 clarification regarding which has been provided. The 11:51  
21 process of obtaining material and witness statements  
22 and the scrutiny of such material is labour-intensive,  
23 time-consuming and will continue throughout the  
24 duration of the Inquiry.

25  
26 In order to ensure that the Inquiry's small team can  
27 properly prepare the evidence and in order to ensure  
28 that witnesses have access to the appropriate material,  
29 I have decided that, in general, the Inquiry will hold

1 hearings on three days each week, at least until  
2 Easter. This may increase after Easter. Normally  
3 hearings will be from Tuesday to Thursday and apart  
4 from our sittings in November and December, the pattern  
5 will be to sit on two weeks, followed by two weeks 11:52  
6 non-sitting. On some days we may hear from more than  
7 one witnesses and some witnesses may have to give  
8 evidence on more than one occasion. Hearings will  
9 continue throughout 2023.

10  
11 I am conscious that many of the witnesses from whom the 11:52  
12 Inquiry has sought Section 21 responses have important  
13 work to do within our healthcare system and it is our  
14 intention only to call witnesses whom we consider we  
15 must hear from in person. Other witnesses who have 11:53  
16 provided evidence may not be called to speak to us in  
17 person but the Inquiry will formally read their  
18 evidence into the record and their responses to the  
19 Section 21 notices they received will be placed on the  
20 Inquiry website in due course. 11:53

21  
22 In reaching any conclusions on the evidence, we will  
23 have regard to all that we hear and read. The  
24 timetable for witnesses can be found on the Inquiry's  
25 website. This will be updated regularly once 11:53  
26 attendance dates have been confirmed. It may be that  
27 changes will have to be made to the timetable at short  
28 notice and updates will be notified on the Inquiry  
29 website. So I would encourage everyone to check the

1 timetable regularly.

2  
3 I am shortly going to ask Mr. Wolfe KC to deliver  
4 counsel's opening statement. I understand that that  
5 will conclude on Thursday. After he has finished, each 11:54  
6 of the legal representatives of the Core Participants  
7 will have the opportunity to make a short opening  
8 statement on behalf of their clients. Next week we  
9 will start to hear from non-patient witnesses. A  
10 schedule for next week's witnesses is on the Inquiry 11:54  
11 website and will be updated the week before each  
12 sitting week with the names of the witnesses who are  
13 coming the following week.

14  
15 We recognise that the Inquiry process is challenging 11:54  
16 for everyone involved but hope that those who are  
17 involved see the Inquiry process in itself as an  
18 opportunity for reflection on what has occurred and an  
19 opportunity to correct mistakes that might have been  
20 made. 11:54

21  
22 It is our hope that all who are asked to help the  
23 Inquiry in fulfilling its Terms of Reference do so  
24 frankly and openly and in a spirit of collaboration,  
25 remembering that the entire raison d'être for the 11:55  
26 Inquiry is to help secure patient safety.

27  
28 I'll now ask Mr. Wolfe to give more details of the  
29 scope and work of the Inquiry. Mr. Wolfe.

1  
2 SUBMISSION BY MR. WOLFE KC:

3  
4 MR. WOLFE KC: Madam Chair, Dr. Swart, Mr. Hanbury,  
5 good morning, just about good morning! I propose 11:55  
6 speaking for just about an hour this morning, what  
7 remains of the morning and then we'll break for lunch.

8  
9 Today marks an important landmark in the life of the  
10 Urology Services Inquiry. For approximately the past 11:55  
11 12 months the Inquiry's legal team has worked  
12 assiduously behind closed doors to begin the process of  
13 investigating the issues described in the Terms of  
14 Reference. We now formally commence the public phase  
15 of the Inquiry's work. 11:56

16  
17 Thank you, Chair, for introducing the members of the  
18 hard-working legal team, they'll thank me for saying  
19 that no doubt, and for referring to the work of the  
20 industrious secretariat. I am indebted to each member 11:56  
21 of the legal team and to the secretariat for their  
22 contribution to the work of the Inquiry to date and for  
23 their assistance in the production of this opening  
24 statement. Of course all errors and inaccuracies  
25 reside with me. 11:56

26  
27 Despite what you've just said, Madam Chair, I must also  
28 extend my appreciation to the legal teams for the three  
29 Core Participants. It has not always been plain

1 sailing. As you have pointed out, Chair, the manner of  
2 disclosure has caused real difficulties and was  
3 eminently avoidable. I do not demur from your  
4 criticism. However, more generally, I am happy to  
5 report that the legal teams have acknowledged their 11:57  
6 obligation to assist the Inquiry and certainly in their  
7 dealings with me and my legal team have recognised the  
8 obligation to work collegiately and to assist the work  
9 of the Inquiry so that we may proceed efficiently.

10  
11 Let me say a few words about the purpose of this 11:57  
12 opening. It is beyond the scope of this opening  
13 statement to reflect upon every facet of the  
14 information which has been gathered as part of the  
15 Inquiry's initial investigations. Rather, we have set 11:58  
16 ourselves the rather more modest objective of outlining  
17 the key issues which have emerged from the  
18 investigations to date and to provide an indication of  
19 our working map for the road ahead. It will be  
20 possible to use that map to point to some of the places 11:58  
21 of interest and the key destinations and to identify  
22 the kinds of questions which will be asked at each  
23 location as part of these public hearings.

24  
25 In the nature of things, there is undoubtedly much that 11:58  
26 is yet to be revealed about the key issues, even to the  
27 legal team which has worked at a pace to provide an  
28 intelligible explanation of the areas of concern.  
29 Therefore, while I am satisfied that our compass is

1 pointing in the right direction, I fully anticipate  
2 that we will have to take the occasional detour into  
3 other areas of interest as the Inquiry progresses.  
4

5 I now wish to say something about the immediate  
6 background to the Inquiry.  
7

11:59

8 This Inquiry was ordered by Mr. Robin Swann, MLA,  
9 Health Minister, in an oral statement which he made to  
10 the Northern Ireland Assembly on 24th November 2020.  
11 The Minister considered that a public inquiry was the  
12 best way to ensure "that the concerns which had been  
13 drawn to the Department's attention would be fully  
14 identified so that the patients and families affected  
15 would see all issues pursued in a transparent and  
16 independent way."  
17

11:59

11:59

18 what were those concerns and how did they come to the  
19 Department's attention?  
20

12:00

21 On 31st July 2020, the Trust's Medical Director  
22 communicated to the Department using the Early Alert  
23 Mechanism. This alert was given the code 182-20. The  
24 alert advised the Department that on 7th June 2020 the  
25 Trust became aware of potential concerns regarding  
26 delays of treatment of surgery patients who were under  
27 the care of an unnamed consultant urologist employed by  
28 the Trust. That consultant urologist was known to be  
29 Mr. Aidan O'Brien, although he was not named in the

12:00

1 alert. The Department was further advised that arising  
2 out of those concerns, a lookback exercise had been  
3 conducted which had examined the consultant's work for  
4 the period 1st January 2019 to 31st May 2020 with the  
5 following results:

12:01

6  
7 Concerns had been identified in 46 out of 147 patients  
8 taken to theatre during the lookback period. Those  
9 concerns were not further explained.

10  
11 Of the 334 elective inpatient cases which had been  
12 reviewed, 120 cases showed a delay in dictation of  
13 outcomes ranging from two to 41 weeks and in the case  
14 of a further 36 patients, there was no record of care  
15 noted on their regional NIECR system. In one of the  
16 elective inpatient cases the concerns were such that  
17 the case had been identified for screening for Serious  
18 Adverse Incident Review. It was indicated that a  
19 further two cases involving prostatic cancer which were  
20 under the management of this consultant were being  
21 screened for Serious Adverse Incident Review or as I  
22 will call it SAI because there were indications of  
23 potential deficiencies in care provided by the  
24 consultant and that these deficiencies potentially had  
25 an impact on patient prognosis.

12:01

12:01

12:02

12:02

26  
27 The early alert also advised the Department that the  
28 Trust had taken a number of steps to follow up on what  
29 had been discovered. Discussions had been held with



1 the General Medical Council Employer Liaison Service.  
2 The case had also been discussed with NHS Resolutions  
3 which had recommended restrictions to clinical  
4 practice, including a restriction on private practice  
5 pending further exploration. The Trust had put that  
6 request to the consultant. 12:03

7  
8 Additionally, the Trust had placed its own restrictions  
9 so that the consultant would no longer undertake  
10 clinical work or access patient information. 12:03

11  
12 A preliminary discussion had been held with the Royal  
13 College of Surgeons regarding the consultant's practice  
14 and the ambit of any necessary lookback exercise. 12:03

15  
16 Mr. Ryan Wilson, acting Director of Secretary Care for  
17 the Department of Health has explained that until the  
18 early alert was received from the Trust, the Department  
19 had no awareness whatsoever of any concerns relating to  
20 Mr. O'Brien or the issues described in the early alert. 12:03

21  
22 The Health Minister was notified of the early alert by  
23 way of a submission from his officials on 6th August  
24 2020. The submission asked the Minister to note the  
25 latest Trust advice that at that time the number of  
26 patients who may have received suboptimal care  
27 comprised a cohort of approximately 230 patients and  
28 that the full scope of the consultant's practice was  
29 not currently known. 12:04

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On 18th August 2020, the Trust submitted an update to the Chief Medical Officer advising that the consultant had now retired, had agreed not to see private patients and, to the Trust's knowledge, was not working for any other Trust. 12:04

The update advised that the Trust was liaising with the GMC, continuing to consider other potential quality of care issues and liaising with the Royal College of Surgeons to consider the import and the extent of the findings to date. It explained that the Trust was minded to make a decision on the requirement for a formal lookback exercise and was preparing to contact service users impacted as part of the SAI process. 12:05

On 24th August 2020, the Trust further updated the Department that decisions were required in relation to requesting the Royal College of Surgeons to carry out a lookback exercise, an appropriate process for investigating the conduct of the consultant, involvement of an expert patient to sit on the panel reviewing what at that time was three SAIs and the timing of external communications concluding with SAI patients and families. 12:05

From 3rd September 2020, that's a little over two months following the early alert, sorry, I should say a little over a month following the early alert, the 12:06

1 Trust hosted weekly meetings with the Department of  
2 Health, the Health and Social Care Board and the Public  
3 Health Agency in order for the Trust to provide an  
4 update regarding its ongoing scoping work in relation  
5 to Mr. O'Brien's patients and plans regarding 12:06  
6 communications with patients and families. This was to  
7 lead to the formal establishment of the Urology  
8 Assurance Group.

9  
10 On 22nd October 2020, the Department notified the Trust 12:07  
11 that it wished to establish such a group and would lead  
12 on that initiative. Draft Terms of Reference and  
13 ultimately final Terms of Reference were provided.

14  
15 The group - that is the Urology Assurance Group - is 12:07  
16 comprised of officials from the Department, the HSEB,  
17 the Public Health Agency and the Trust and sits under  
18 the Chairmanship of the Department's permanent  
19 Secretary. It provides external oversight of the work  
20 streams undertaken by the Trust to address the concerns 12:07  
21 identified in its Urology Services Department.

22  
23 On 15th October 2020, the Trust sent a full background  
24 report to the Department containing a history of events  
25 relating to Mr. O'Brien, a summary of clinical concerns 12:08  
26 and an outline of the plans being put in place to  
27 respond to primary care colleagues and to establish a  
28 patient helpline.  
29

1 On 15th October 2020, due to issues which were emerging  
2 in relation to the consultant's prescribing practices,  
3 the early alert was updated by the Trust. By this  
4 date, the Trust had appointed an SAI review team under  
5 the external and independent leadership of Dr. Dermot 12:08  
6 Hughes to begin to review what would eventually become  
7 nine Serious Adverse Incidents. The updated alert  
8 reported to the Department that following a meeting of  
9 the review team, additional concerns had been brought  
10 to Trust's attention regarding prescribing of the 12:09  
11 medication Bicalutamide. Those concerned were  
12 described as involving the use of unlicensed  
13 sub-therapeutic doses of the drug, which the Trust  
14 considered as a significant and potentially wide  
15 patient-safety risk requiring immediate reaction. The 12:09  
16 updated alert pointed to the fact that the urgent  
17 regional action which was required, that patients and  
18 clients would need to be contacted about possible harm  
19 and that there was a potential for regional media  
20 interest. 12:09

21  
22 On 16th October 2020, due to a concern that there was  
23 inadequate assurance that Mr. O'Brien would not desist  
24 from further medical practice, the Chief Medical  
25 Officer issued a series of alert letters advising 12:10  
26 healthcare providers throughout the United Kingdom to  
27 contact the Southern Trust if Mr. O'Brien was to seek  
28 employment with their organisation.  
29

1 The letters were cancelled on 24th November 2020 after  
2 satisfactory undertakings were provided by Mr. O'Brien  
3 that he had no intention of seeking further employment.  
4

5 On 26th October 2020, the Health Minister received a  
6 submission from his officials advising him of these 12:10  
7 further developments and recommending that he make a  
8 brief written statement to the Assembly with a view to  
9 making a more detailed oral statement later. The  
10 Minister accepted that advice and a written statement 12:11  
11 was lodged that day with the Assembly in which he  
12 indicated that an early alert had been sent to the  
13 Department on 31st July, that the concerns referred to  
14 in the alert were being examined and that a Urology  
15 Assurance Group had been established. 12:11  
16

17 So, Madam Chair, that was the first articulation in the  
18 public sphere by the Health Minister as to the  
19 developments which he was then aware of.  
20

21 The Minister received a further submission from his  
22 officials on 20th November 2020. This submission  
23 recommended that due to the seriousness and extent of  
24 the concerns identified with the practice of  
25 Mr. O'Brien, a public inquiry should be established 12:12  
26 under the Inquiries Act.  
27

28 As I mentioned a short time ago, the Minister made a  
29 detailed oral statement to the Assembly on 24th

1 November to indicate that he had accepted that  
2 recommendation and identifying Mr. O'Brien as the  
3 consultant whose practices had given rise to the  
4 immediate concerns.

5  
6 Chair, it is worthy of note that this  
7 healthcare-related public inquiry takes its place and  
8 commences its hearings in the wake of the publication  
9 of the report of the Independent Urology Inquiry and  
10 only some four years after the publication of the  
11 report of the Inquiry into Hyponatremia-related Deaths  
12 in Northern Ireland. Another public Inquiry, the  
13 Muckamore Abbey Hospital Public Inquiry, has recently  
14 commenced its work.

15  
16 It will be for others to comment on what these public  
17 Inquiries may have in common, beyond their connection  
18 with healthcare settings in Northern Ireland. It is  
19 notable, however, that the reports of both the  
20 neurology Inquiry and the Hyponatraemia Inquiry point  
21 to significant governance concerns and the report for  
22 each inquiry contains recommendations for governance  
23 improvement and reform.

24  
25 The need for these inquiries and their proliferation is  
26 undoubtedly a matter of public concern. The Neurology  
27 Inquiry was announced by the Permanent Secretary to the  
28 Department of Health in May 2018 and was converted to a  
29 statutory Inquiry by the Health Minister in December

1 2020. The Inquiry was established after Northern  
2 Ireland's largest ever patient recall. The recall  
3 revealed that a considerable number of patients had  
4 been misdiagnosed and/or mistreated. The report was  
5 published on 21st June of this year and made 76  
6 recommendations. A number of those recommendations  
7 related to the MHPS policy, which is an area of concern  
8 for this Inquiry also.

12:14

9  
10 I will address those recommendations later in this  
11 opening statement during what will be a detailed  
12 consideration of the MHPS framework.

12:14

13  
14 The Hyponatraemia Inquiry considered the deaths of five  
15 children amid concerns that their deaths were caused by  
16 fluid mismanagement. The Inquiry's report was  
17 published in January 2018. It made 96 recommendations  
18 to the Department and we understand that these have  
19 been transferred into 120 actions. The Inquiry has  
20 been told that 45 of the recommendations have been  
21 implemented and that the Minister of Health will soon  
22 be updating the Assembly in respect of same, assuming  
23 the Assembly returns of course.

12:15

12:15

24  
25 Many of the recommendations have centred around  
26 concerns about candour and openness and the use that  
27 was made of Serious Adverse Incident Reviews.  
28 Mr. Peter May, the current Permanent Secretary of the  
29 Department of Health, has indicated to the Inquiry that

12:15

1 when these recommendations are fully implemented, they  
2 will have implications for the medical profession in  
3 relation to candour and being open, death  
4 certification, the Trust's duty of quality, paediatric  
5 care, Serious Adverse Incidents, education and 12:16  
6 training, and professional regulation.

7  
8 The Inquiry will wish to learn more about the package  
9 of reforms which are being implemented following those  
10 Inquiries and will have an opportunity to examine this 12:16  
11 issue with departmental witnesses when they attend with  
12 us next week.

13  
14 I want to say something more about the context for this  
15 particular Inquiry. 12:16

16  
17 What is the Urology Services Inquiry about?

18  
19 In specific terms, this is an inquiry which is focused  
20 on patient safety. The reports emanating from the 12:16  
21 Trust acknowledge that patients of its Urology  
22 Department have suffered harm or been placed at risk of  
23 harm because of clinical and governance shortcomings.  
24 It is the Inquiry's most basic function to investigate  
25 how that situation has occurred and to determine how it 12:17  
26 wasn't prevented; to make findings and to report.

27  
28 It is regularly reported that the Health Service in  
29 Northern Ireland is the subject of the most tremendous



1 pressures and strains. Nevertheless, all patients of  
2 our publicly-funded Health Service have a right to  
3 expect that despite the challenges, that the care that  
4 they receive will be safe and of the highest standard.  
5 We all have experience of the talented and resourceful 12:18  
6 healthcare professionals who staff our hospitals and  
7 healthcare settings and who every day go beyond the  
8 call of duty in an effort to achieve this goal. But  
9 sometimes shortcomings occur which place patients at  
10 risk and cause substantial harm, and when this happens, 12:18  
11 repeatedly or in large numbers, as is reportedly the  
12 case here, it is important that challenging questions  
13 are asked, learning points are extracted and  
14 appropriate recommendations made.

15  
16 The immediate context for this Inquiry can be  
17 summarised in the following terms:

18  
19 Mr. Aidan O'Brien was an experienced consultant  
20 urologist whose practice gave cause for concern in 2017 12:19  
21 that he was temporarily excluded from the workplace,  
22 allowed to return to work under a monitoring  
23 arrangement, and subjected to an investigation under  
24 the MHPS framework. That investigation took place in  
25 2017 and 2018 at the same time as, or overlapping with, 12:19  
26 the conduct of a number of Serious Adverse Incident  
27 Reviews which concerned, at least in part, his role in  
28 the triage and/or the care of seven patients. Two  
29 further SAI Reviews were triggered in 2018, which were

1 again concerned with his role, at least in part, in the  
2 care of patients. The SAI Reviews found significant  
3 deficits in the management or care of all nine  
4 patients, leading to harm or the risk of harm, although  
5 only one SAI report was finalised before 2020. 12:20  
6 The MHPS investigation reported in 2018 and upheld the  
7 concerns which had been raised. Those concerns related  
8 to the failure to triage large numbers of referrals;  
9 the failure to dictate clinical correspondence  
10 following outpatients clinics for large numbers of 12:21  
11 patients; the retention of large numbers of patients'  
12 notes at home or in his office; and the advantaging of  
13 some private patients. It was determined, following  
14 this investigation, that Mr. O'Brien should appear  
15 before a conduct hearing and that a further action plan 12:21  
16 with monitoring and a job plan should be formulated.  
17 It was also determined that there should be an  
18 independent review of administrative arrangements  
19 because of systemic management failings.

20 12:21  
21 Only the latter recommendation was carried out; that is  
22 the review of the systemic management failings. Only  
23 that was carried out and even this took almost two  
24 years to commence. The actions in relation to  
25 Mr. O'Brien were not addressed at all. 12:22  
26

27 In 2020 further concerns emerged shortly before and  
28 shortly after Mr. O'Brien's retirement. Those concerns  
29 gave rise to a further nine Serious Adverse Incident

1           Reviews as well as a formal lookback Review which  
2           considered the care of 2,112 patients who were under  
3           the management of Mr. O'Brien in the period between  
4           January 2019 and June 2020. The SAI Reviews have  
5           reported additional significant shortcomings in the           12:23  
6           management and care of all nine patients and instances  
7           of harm or risk of harm to those patients. In  
8           particular, the SAI report authored by Dr. Hughes,  
9           documented that four of the nine patients reported on  
10          suffered serious and significant deficits in their           12:23  
11          care. They also found the systems of governance were  
12          in effective.

13  
14          Arising out of the formal lookback Review, the Trust  
15          has reported the following:           12:23

16  
17          In addition to the nine SAI patients which I have just  
18          mentioned, a further 53 patient cases have met the  
19          threshold for a Serious Adverse Incident and are being  
20          examined under a separate process called Structured           12:24  
21          Clinical Record Review. An additional 583 patient  
22          cases revealed 777 instances of suboptimal care in  
23          areas such as diagnostics, medication, treatment,  
24          communication (including recording-keeping and  
25          referral), although they did not meet the threshold for           12:24  
26          a Serious Adverse Incident Review.

27  
28          The RQIA has recently recommended that urgent  
29          consideration should be given to expanding the temporal

1 parameters of the lookback process.

2  
3 Chair, that is a broad overview of the clinical context  
4 which has prompted this Inquiry. Based on these  
5 reports, a significant number of patients have been 12:25  
6 adversely affected. This overview doesn't, however,  
7 describe the scope of the Inquiry's work. To answer  
8 that question, it is necessary to reach for the  
9 Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

10  
11 The Terms of Reference, Madam Chair, can be found at  
12 INQ-50001. I'm going to ask James to put it up on the  
13 screen for us, if only to prove that I know how to use  
14 this system! The Terms of Reference are contained over  
15 two pages and I will begin this section of my statement 12:26  
16 by highlighting key aspects of the Terms.

17  
18 As the Health Minister explained in his statement to  
19 the Assembly on 31st August 2021, the process of  
20 developing the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry 12:26  
21 included stakeholder engagement with patients and  
22 families affected, and the Assembly's Healthcare  
23 Committee, as well as consultation with you, Chair.  
24 The Inquiry is bound by the Terms of Reference and is  
25 required to apply them fully. The Terms of Reference 12:26  
26 provide the formal boundaries within which the Inquiry  
27 must conduct its work. They inform the nature and  
28 extent of the investigations which the legal team is to  
29 perform on the Inquiry's behalf. Over the next two

1 days or so I will begin to sketch out how we have set  
2 out the task of implementing the Terms of Reference,  
3 what has been discovered to date, what issues remain to  
4 be explored and how this is to be done. I'll refer to  
5 aspects of the Terms frequently throughout the 12:27  
6 statement but it is important you obtain a sense of the  
7 key aspects of those terms at the outset so that we are  
8 clear as to the direction of travel.

9  
10 There are a number of prominent features of the Terms 12:27  
11 of Reference which are immediately obvious and which  
12 should be emphasised and explained. It can be seen  
13 that this is a statutory Inquiry. This Inquiry has  
14 been established pursuant to and operates within the  
15 terms of the Inquiries Act 2005. It can use and has 12:27  
16 used the powers contained within that legislation. The  
17 fact that this Inquiry has been afforded the status of  
18 a statutory public inquiry speaks to the gravity of the  
19 issues which are to be explored as part of its remit  
20 and the implication of those issues for the public. 12:28

21  
22 Importantly, this is also an independent Inquiry.  
23 Since the activities which are to be scrutinised by the  
24 Inquiry fall within the ambit of the Department of  
25 Health, it is normal that it is department which 12:28  
26 sponsors the Inquiry. That means that the Inquiry is  
27 funded from the budget of the Department and it is to  
28 the Health Minister that the Inquiry shall report and  
29 make recommendations. But the Inquiry stands apart

1 from the Minister and its officials and conducts its  
2 affairs in a manner which is wholly independent of the  
3 Department. The Inquiry's investigation is not the  
4 subject of oversight by the Department and nor has  
5 there been any attempt to direct the Inquiry's work or 12:28  
6 its interpretation or application of the Terms of  
7 Reference.

8  
9 I speak for the legal team when I say that we value and  
10 jealously guard the independence of our work and we 12:29  
11 hold in the highest regard the fact that this empowers  
12 us to thoroughly investigate all of the issues and all  
13 of the persons and bodies identified within the Terms  
14 of Reference without fear or favour.

15 12:29  
16 I will shortly describe the bodies which are the  
17 subject of the Inquiry's interest. It can be seen, if  
18 we just focus in on Part (b) of our Terms of Reference,  
19 that the Terms of Reference -- sorry, it can be seen  
20 from Part (b) of the Terms of Reference that the 12:29  
21 Inquiry must evaluate the clinical and governance  
22 arrangements within the Trust which gave rise to the  
23 need to conduct a lookback review. As part of that  
24 work, the Inquiry has been specifically charged with  
25 examining the communication and escalation of the 12:30  
26 reporting of issues related to patient care and safety  
27 within and between the Trust and the following public  
28 bodies: The Health and Social Care Board, as it was  
29 then called; the Public Health Agency; and the

1 Department. It will also be necessary to make an  
2 assessment of the role of the Trust's Board. In the  
3 course of this opening statement I will further explain  
4 the role of these public bodies and I will explore, in  
5 some detail, the role of the Trust Board in association 12:30  
6 with Trust's governance arrangements.

7  
8 Let me now say a little more about the issues contained  
9 in the Terms which must be investigated. Necessarily  
10 the Terms have been formulated in a concise manner 12:31  
11 without detailed elaboration. I will attempt to  
12 further explain what is contemplated by these terms.

13  
14 First and foremost this is patient-centred. You have  
15 made that remark already, Chair, and I would underscore 12:31  
16 it.

17  
18 Part (d) of the Terms of Reference enjoins the Inquiry  
19 to afford patients and/or their families an opportunity  
20 to report their experiences. The Inquiry prioritised 12:31  
21 the need to receive evidence from patients and their  
22 families and convened private hearings in June and  
23 September for that purpose.

24  
25 The second point of note is that this Inquiry concerns 12:31  
26 matters arising out of the provision of urology  
27 services at the Southern Trust. I will shortly tell  
28 you something about that Trust and where it sits within  
29 the Northern Ireland healthcare structures. I will

1 also tell you about the arrangements and the delivery  
2 of urology services provided by the Trust, their origin  
3 and development, the work that it is performed and the  
4 difficulties that are faced.

5  
6 Another significant feature of the Terms of Reference  
7 is the name Mr. Aidan O'Brien. He is the only medical  
8 practitioner named within the Terms. Mr. O'Brien was a  
9 consultant urologist who was employed by the Trust from  
10 in or about 1992 through to his retirement in July 12:32  
11 2020, a period of some 28 years. In a short while I  
12 will tell you some more about him and what he has told  
13 the Inquiry about the issues under consideration.

14  
15 It is clear from the Terms of Reference that the 12:32  
16 concerns which have been expressed about the  
17 performance of Mr. O'Brien during his employment at the  
18 Trust are a significant aspect of the Inquiry's work.  
19 Nevertheless, I wish to emphasise the basic fact that  
20 this is not the Aidan O'Brien Inquiry, despite what is 12:33  
21 sometimes reported. The Inquiry must examine aspects  
22 of Mr. O'Brien's work, especially those cases which it  
23 met the threshold for a Serious Adverse Incident. We  
24 will use the available evidence to search for, describe  
25 and catalogue shortcomings in clinical practice but it 12:33  
26 is not the function of this Inquiry to make findings in  
27 individual cases or reach conclusions on causation  
28 issues, for example. That is more properly the domain  
29 of civil proceedings.



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As you have already emphasised, Chair, the Inquiry's examination of the clinical aspects of the identified cases serves a specific objective. That objective does not involve inquiry into Mr. O'Brien's clinical practice as such. Instead, the key focus of the Inquiry's work is to scrutinise the Trust's governance arrangements. That much is clear from paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) of the Terms of Reference in particular. The Trust's framework for clinical and social care governance shall be examined to determine whether and to what extent it permitted clinical shortcomings to a care, whether those shortcomings were known and unremedied or unchallenged, or whether they remained undetected during the course of Mr. O'Brien's employment, and whether this undermined patient care and placed patient safety in jeopardy.

12:34  
12:34  
12:35

So, the critical mainstay of the Inquiry's work is not to investigate Mr. O'Brien per se, but it will be to examine the systems of clinical governance to expose any weaknesses or gaps in those systems and, if appropriate, to hold to account those systems and those who operated them. This is not the expression of a pedantic detail, it is an important point of substance. I say this, not only in fairness to Mr. O'Brien, but also in order to direct particular attention to the focus of the Inquiry's work as it is defined in the Terms of Reference.

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Mr. O'Brien's name appears prominently in the Terms of Reference because it has been reported that he failed to practise his profession safely or in accordance with accepted norms so that some of his patients were the subject of substandard treatment. It is his practices or primarily has practices which will be used as the vehicle to test the effectiveness and reliability of the governance arrangements. Some of those practices have attracted the attention of the General Medical Council. It is the responsibility of the GMC to investigate allegations that a doctor's fitness to practise is impaired. The GMC exercises this function in order to protect the public. It will investigate where there is a concern that a doctor's actions fall seriously or persistently below the standards the GMC expect. Following an investigation, if the GMC's case examiners decide that there is a realistic prospect of establishing that a practitioner's fitness to practise is impaired, they may decide to refer the matter to the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service which will independently adjudicate on the matter and make findings.

12:36

12:36

12:37

12:37

The nature and scope of the GMC's investigations are generally confidential to the practitioner, the complainant or referrer and the Council. However, it is a matter of public record that the GMC is actively investigating the fitness to practise of Mr. O'Brien.

12:37

1 The Inquiry understands that this investigation  
2 continues. The GMC has not finalised allegations  
3 against Mr. O'Brien and a hearing before the Medical  
4 Practitioners Tribunal has not been arranged at this  
5 time. If there are any developments in that respect, I 12:38  
6 will update the Inquiry accordingly.

7  
8 Mr. O'Brien is currently registered with the GMC with a  
9 licence to practise medicine. However, he has been the  
10 subject of an interim order since 2020, which means 12:38  
11 that there are conditions attached to that  
12 registration. That order was initially imposed for a  
13 period of 18 months but was the subject of extension by  
14 the High Court in Northern Ireland on 13th June of this  
15 year and will expire on 14th June 2023. The conditions 12:38  
16 provide, inter alia, that Mr. O'Brien will only  
17 practise in non-clinical roles or in medicolegal work.  
18 They provide for a range of notification and disclosure  
19 obligations in the event that employment is obtained  
20 and they permit the GMC to exchange information with 12:39  
21 any employer or contracting body. It is the Inquiry's  
22 understanding that Mr. O'Brien is not currently  
23 employed in any capacity.

24  
25 Chair, the Terms of Reference are explicit in 12:39  
26 emphasising that this Inquiry shall not encroach upon  
27 the jurisdiction of the GMC, and I understand and  
28 expect that that is a line that we will thoroughly  
29 respect in the work that we conduct.

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The alleged clinical shortcomings of Mr. O'Brien which have been reported to the Inquiry are not isolated cases. We are instead dealing with a significant number of cases over a prolonged period of time and across a range of clinical issues and administrative issues associated with the safe practice of medicine. It has been acknowledged by the Trust that some patients have suffered significant harm as a result of these shortcomings and it has apologised for the harm that has been suffered.

12:40

12:40

For example, in the overarching Serious Adverse Incident Review report published on 1st March 2021 in respect of the nine patients I have previously mentioned, the Trust offered the following words:

12:40

"The Southern Trust recognise the life-changing and devastating consequences to the nine families. It wishes to offer an unequivocal apology to all the patients and their families involved in this review. This was not the cancer care they expected and should not have been the cancer care that they received."

12:40

That can be found referenced at DOH-00113.

12:41

As appears from Part (c) of your Terms of Reference, the Inquiry has been charged with the responsibility of examining the clinical aspects of those cases which

1 have met the threshold for a Serious Adverse Incident  
2 with the dominant purpose of investigating the  
3 governance aspects. The Inquiry's primary interest  
4 will be in the cases of patients for whom Mr. O'Brien  
5 provided care and was responsible as consultant 12:41  
6 urologist. That is the direction in which the Terms of  
7 Reference point and based on our investigations to  
8 date, the vast majority of Serious Adverse Incident  
9 Reviews which have emerged from the Trust's urology  
10 service in recent years have involved the work of 12:42  
11 Mr. O'Brien, at least in part.

12  
13 The Inquiry has discovered that there have been 16  
14 Serious Adverse Incident Reviews relating to care  
15 provided by Mr. O'Brien, at least in part, to 20 12:42  
16 patients in the period since 2010. The Inquiry has  
17 just been made aware of the 16th SAI which we are  
18 currently in the process of reviewing.

19  
20 Furthermore, the Inquiry will wish to examine whether 12:42  
21 other cases which may have met the threshold for SAI --  
22 sorry, I'll commence that sentence again. Furthermore,  
23 the Inquiry will wish to examine whether other cases  
24 which may have met the threshold for SAI were wrongly  
25 or inappropriately screened out of the process. 12:43  
26

27 Additionally, as I have mentioned already, the Trust  
28 has indicated that as part of its lookback review, 53  
29 other cases relating to Mr. O'Brien's practice have

1 also met the threshold for SAI but it has been decided  
2 to examine those cases under that other process called  
3 Structured Clinical Record Review.  
4

5 I will outline in greater detail what has been reported 12:43  
6 to the Inquiry in these respects in a short time.  
7

8 I would wish to emphasise that Part (c) of our Terms of  
9 Reference empowers the Inquiry to examine the clinical  
10 aspects of any case of concern for the purposes of 12:44  
11 providing a comprehensive report into the governance of  
12 patient care and safety within the Trust's urology  
13 speciality. This means that the Inquiry is not  
14 restricted to looking at the work of Mr. O'Brien for  
15 these purposes. The Inquiry will determine for itself 12:44  
16 whether any case, regardless of the clinician involved,  
17 should be scrutinised for the purposes of making  
18 determinations in relation to the governance aspect.  
19

20 Part (a) of the Terms of Reference poses a question: 12:44  
21 Is there anything which should have alerted the  
22 Southern Trust to instigate an earlier and more  
23 thorough investigation? I'll just focus on Part (a) of  
24 the Terms. Thank you, James.  
25

26 The Inquiry will wish to consider the information which 12:45  
27 has been presented, where it indicates that concerns  
28 relating to how Mr. O'Brien practised were known to his  
29 colleagues and to medical and operational management

1 within the Trust for some years before the events in  
2 2020 which triggered this public inquiry. Some of  
3 those practice issues were the subject of informal  
4 discussion and challenge as part of day-to-day  
5 management. Other issues were formally considered 12:45  
6 through the SAI process. Additionally, I have  
7 indicated that Mr. O'Brien was temporarily excluded  
8 from the workplace at the start of 2017 and that a  
9 formal investigation took place under the MHPS  
10 Framework. The Inquiry will no doubt wish to ask very 12:45  
11 specific questions about the quality and effectiveness  
12 of the steps which were taken both before and after the  
13 MHPS process was used.

14  
15 It can be seen from paragraph (e) of the Terms of 12:46  
16 Reference that the implementation of the MHPS policy in  
17 the context of the investigation into Mr. O'Brien is to  
18 be a central component of the Inquiry's work.  
19 Therefore, I will say something more about that MHPS  
20 investigation and its output in the course of this 12:46  
21 opening statement so that the Inquiry may begin the  
22 task of considering, for the purposes of both Part (a)  
23 and Part (e), whether that process was effective and  
24 whether there was a missed opportunity to get to grips  
25 with the problems before further significant issues 12:46  
26 came to light from June 2020. Part of that  
27 consideration will involve an examination of whether  
28 the pressures on clinicians such as Mr. O'Brien were  
29 such that it became difficult to practise safely in all

1 respects; was there a need to reevaluate his role or  
2 the role of others in the delivery of certain services  
3 or to provide greater support to him? And was that  
4 support forthcoming?

5  
6 Furthermore, building upon its understanding of how  
7 MHPS was applied in this case, the Inquiry will give  
8 consideration to whether this policy is broadly  
9 effective or whether it requires strengthening.

10  
11 Ultimately, it will be for the Inquiry to bring these  
12 various strands together, to identify learning points,  
13 to make appropriate recommendations, and to report, as  
14 required, by Parts (f) and (g) of the Terms. The  
15 conduct of a public inquiry such as this can act as a  
16 watershed moment. If those who are to participate are  
17 prepared to engage cooperatively, authentically, and in  
18 a spirit of openness, and if they actively reflect upon  
19 what they, as well as their colleagues, could have done  
20 differently, or better, there will be a genuine  
21 opportunity to change healthcare provision in Northern  
22 Ireland for the better.

23  
24 Let me briefly set out the work of this Inquiry to  
25 date. I know, Chair, that you have touched on some of  
26 the vital statistics. They may bear repeating and  
27 emphasis.

28  
29 We're able to open the public hearings of this Inquiry



1 today because for the past 12 months the legal team has  
2 engaged with the Core Participants and other bodies and  
3 persons as part of an intensive evidence-gathering  
4 phase. We have drafted and issued separate staff and  
5 patient questionnaires and received an excellent 12:49  
6 response. To date, the Inquiry has received 14 patient  
7 or family questionnaire responses, and eight patients  
8 have gone on to give oral evidence to the Inquiry at  
9 our hearings in June and September.

10  
11 The Inquiry has identified 16 medical registrars and  
12 200 qualified nursing staff to be of interest and  
13 questionnaires have been issued to them. The Inquiry  
14 has received questionnaire responses from nine  
15 registrars and 116 nursing staff. At an appropriate 12:50  
16 point, the results from those questionnaires will be  
17 reviewed and the results disseminated.

18  
19 Chair, an important point of the Inquiry's work has  
20 been to use your powers under Section 21 of the 12:50  
21 Inquiries Act to issue notices to compel witnesses to  
22 produce documents and to provide a witness statement.  
23 Each of the Core Participants have answered notices and  
24 the responses are normally authored by the senior  
25 employee in the organisation. For example, the Chief 12:50  
26 Executive of the Trust has answered notices, as has the  
27 Permanent Secretary of the Department of Health.  
28 Mr. O'Brien has very recently provided a detailed  
29 response which is currently being reviewed. The

1 process of issuing notices is an ongoing one and it is  
2 anticipated that further notices will be issued  
3 throughout the life of the Inquiry.  
4

5 To date, the Inquiry has issued 111 notices and has 12:51  
6 received 87 responses with 24 responses outstanding.  
7 Some witnesses have been called upon to address more  
8 than one notice. The Inquiry has received responses  
9 from a total of 66 witnesses to date. It has not yet  
10 been necessary to take enforcement action to compel 12:51  
11 compliance with a notice but the Inquiry reserves the  
12 right to do so, if necessary, in an appropriate case.  
13

14 The Inquiry has accumulated a significant volume of  
15 documents and materials using this process. Some of 12:51  
16 those documents are still in the process of being  
17 sorted and referenced. At a conservative estimate, the  
18 Inquiry has received in the region of 400,000  
19 individual pages of material from the Core Participants  
20 and their staff members, the vast majority of which at 12:52  
21 200,000 pages has been disclosed by the Southern Trust.  
22 The Inquiry has received materials from individual  
23 witnesses, and a separate witness bundle has been  
24 compiled. It currently stands at more than 80,000  
25 pages of documentation. The volume of material 12:52  
26 assembled speaks to the significance and complexity of  
27 the Inquiry's work.  
28

29 I want to finish this opening section of the opening

1 statement by setting out the areas I intend to look at  
2 over the next couple of days.

3  
4 Chair, having regard to the major thematic issues which  
5 emerge from the Terms of Reference, I intend to work 12:52  
6 through the remainder of this opening statement in four  
7 parts.

8  
9 Part 1:

10 12:53  
11 Part 1 is an introduction to the Core Participants and  
12 the other persons or bodies named in our Terms of  
13 Reference. So we'll be looking at the Department of  
14 Health, the Southern Trust and within the Southern  
15 Trust we'll be looking at the Urology Services Unit, 12:53  
16 the Trust Board. I will then move on to say something  
17 further about Mr. O'Brien. We will look at the Health  
18 and Social Care Board and the Public Health Authority.

19  
20 Part 2 of this opening statement primarily engages 12:53  
21 Parts (c) and (d) of the Terms of Reference, what in  
22 short form I can call the clinical aspects. Here I  
23 will document what the Inquiry has established so far  
24 in relation to the recorded concern that patients have  
25 been harmed or placed at risk of harm by shortcomings 12:54  
26 in the clinical activities of Mr. O'Brien.

27  
28 I will refer to the patient and family evidence which  
29 the Inquiry has received. I will describe the Serious

1 Adverse Incident Reviews, the SDRR process, and the  
2 lookback process, including an audit of the  
3 prescription of the drug Bicalutamide, and I will refer  
4 to the findings which have so far emerged from each of  
5 these processes.

12:54

6 I will spend some time explaining the significance of  
7 the multidisciplinary team approach to patient care. I  
8 will refer to the conclusions reached in a recent  
9 report by the Royal College of Surgeons which  
10 considered a random sample of patients who were under  
11 the care of Mr. O'Brien in 2015 and which suggests that  
12 there may be a need to expand the Trust's lookback  
13 review. I will also detail the concerns expressed by  
14 the RQIA about the conduct of the current lookback  
15 review.

12:55

12:55

16  
17 Part 3 of my opening statement will specifically focus  
18 on Part (e) of the Terms of Reference; that is the MHPS  
19 policy or to give it its full time, Managing High  
20 Professional Standards. Here I will explain the  
21 function and purpose of the MHPS framework and explain  
22 some of its cardinal operating principles.

12:55

23  
24 I will outline the steps which were taken by the Trust  
25 and which led to the use of that framework in order to  
26 investigate concerns regarding Mr. O'Brien in 2017 to  
27 '18, the findings of that investigation, and what  
28 followed thereafter.

12:55

1 chair, it will become clear that the MHPS process will  
2 be an important area of consideration for the Inquiry.  
3 Taken together, parts 2 and 3 of this opening statement  
4 will touch upon issues and material which will be  
5 relevant to paragraph (a) of the Terms of Reference and 12:56  
6 the question of whether an earlier and more thorough  
7 investigation was indicated.

8  
9 Finally, part 4 of my opening statement will touch upon  
10 Parts (b), (c) and (f) of your Terms of Reference. 12:56  
11 Here I will sketch out the key components of the  
12 corporate and clinical governance arrangements and  
13 examine, in summary fashion, how the governance  
14 framework responded to the circumstances which  
15 ultimately gave rise to the lookback review. I will 12:57  
16 also place before you some material which will allow  
17 the Inquiry to begin to consider the vulnerabilities of  
18 that framework and whether it was fit for purpose.

19  
20 At this point, coming up to one o'clock, I think I've 12:57  
21 reached a convenient point in the opening to invite you  
22 to rise and maybe sit again at two o'clock?

23 CHAIR: Certainly, Mr. wolfe. The Inquiry will sit  
24 again at two o'clock. Thank you.

25  
26 THE HEARING ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH AND CONTINUED AS  
27 FOLLOWS:

28  
29 CHAIR: Good afternoon, everyone. Mr. wolfe.

1 MR. WOLFE KC: Good afternoon, Madam Chair. I think  
2 it's our intention, all being well, to sit all the way  
3 through to at least four o'clock, but maybe a little  
4 after four o'clock and I'll stop at a convenient point  
5 in my speaking note.

14:07

6 I'm about to commence now with the first part, first  
7 formal part of the opening in relation to the Core  
8 Participants and others. I'll spend some time  
9 introducing the bodies and persons referred to in the  
10 Terms of Reference. It's really in the form of a pen  
11 picture. There'll be other opportunities, during the  
12 course of this statement, to look at detailed aspects  
13 of these persons and bodies.

14:07

14 So, commencing with the three Core Participants and  
15 initially the Department of Health.

14:07

16  
17  
18 The Department of Health is one of nine devolved  
19 departments provided for by the Northern Ireland Act  
20 1998 and the Fresh Start Stormont House Agreement and  
21 implementation plan. The Department has described its  
22 public task as to help the Northern Ireland Executive  
23 secure the most appropriate and effective use of  
24 resources and services for the benefit of the  
25 community. In pursuing this aim, the key objective of  
26 the Department is to deliver quality, cost-effective  
27 and an efficient public Health Service throughout  
28 Northern Ireland with its core functions carried out  
29 within a legislative framework. The Department is

14:08

14:08

1 responsible for three main areas:

2  
3 Health and social care, including family practitioner  
4 services, personal social services, community health  
5 policy and legislation; public health; and thirdly 14:09  
6 public safety to include legislation and policy for the  
7 Fire and Rescue Service.

8  
9 The Department has referred to its mission as being to  
10 improve health and social wellbeing of the people of 14:09  
11 Northern Ireland. It endeavours to do so by leading a  
12 major programme of cross government action to improve  
13 the health and wellbeing of the population, and reduce  
14 health inequalities including by using interventions  
15 involving health promotion and education to encourage 14:09  
16 people to adopt activities, behaviours and attitudes  
17 which will lead to better health and wellbeing. The  
18 aim is to develop a population which is much more  
19 engaged in ensuring its own health and wellbeing. The  
20 Department has set itself the objective of ensuring the 14:09  
21 provision of appropriate health and social care  
22 services both in clinical settings such as hospitals  
23 and GP services and in the community through nursing,  
24 social work and professional services.

25 14:10  
26 Within the Department there are a number of key  
27 business groups. These are the Resources and  
28 Performance Management Group, the Healthcare Policy  
29 Group, the Social Services Policy Group, the Office of

1 the Chief Medical Officer.

2  
3 The Permanent Secretary of the Department is currently  
4 Peter May. At the time when this Inquiry was  
5 announced, the Permanent Secretary was Mr. Richard 14:10  
6 Pengelly. The Permanent Secretary is principal adviser  
7 to the departmental minister for all departmental  
8 activities and principal accounting officer responsible  
9 to the Northern Ireland Assembly through the Public  
10 Accounts Committee for the sound management of public 14:10  
11 funds. The Permanent Secretary is required to ensure  
12 that the Department and its subsidiaries operate  
13 effectively.

14  
15 The Health and Social Care (Reform) Act (Northern 14:11  
16 Ireland) 2009 established a number of arm's length  
17 bodies. They include the six Health and Social Care  
18 Trusts, the Health and Social Care Board, the Health  
19 Promotion Agency as well as the Regulation and Quality  
20 Improvement Authority, the RQIA, the Patient and Client 14:11  
21 Care Council and the Regional Business Services  
22 Organisation.

23  
24 Mr. May explains that the Department delegates its  
25 operational responsibilities to its arm's length 14:11  
26 bodies. The arm's length bodies in turn operate  
27 independently of the Department and are governed by  
28 specific statutory provisions. Each body is  
29 nevertheless accountable to the Department and subject



1 to its direction.

2  
3 The Minister then is accountable to the Northern  
4 Ireland Assembly when sitting for the activities and  
5 performance of all arm's length bodies, including the 14:11  
6 Southern Trust.

7  
8 The Permanent Secretary is responsible for the overall  
9 organisation, management and staffing of the sponsor  
10 department. As departmental accounting officer, the 14:12  
11 Permanent Secretary also designates the Chief Executive  
12 of each Trust as its accounting officer.

13  
14 The departmental accounting officer shall ensure that  
15 the Trust's strategic aims and objectives support the 14:12  
16 sponsor department's wider strategic aims and is also  
17 responsible for ensuring the arrangements are in place  
18 to continuously monitor the Trust activities to measure  
19 progress against approved targets, standards and  
20 actions and to assess compliance with safety and 14:12  
21 quality, governance, risk management and other relevant  
22 requirements.

23  
24 The departmental accounting officer shall assess risks  
25 through objectives and activities, address significant 14:12  
26 problems in the Trust and bring concerns about the  
27 activities of the Trust to the attention of the Trust  
28 Board.

29

1 The Department sets the framework, budget, priorities  
2 and targets for each Trust. The Chief Executive of the  
3 Trust, as its accounting officer, is accountable  
4 through the Permanent Secretary to the Minister and  
5 Assembly in terms of performance and expenditure of  
6 resources.

14:13

7  
8 In addition to statutory requirements, the Minister of  
9 Health issues directions and guidance which are  
10 incorporated into Standing Orders or other corporate  
11 governance documentation, including notably codes of  
12 practice and accountability and the HPSS code of  
13 practice on openness. The Trust must comply with all  
14 existing legislation, Department of Health Framework  
15 document, management statement, financial memorandum,  
16 codes of conduct and accountability and relevant  
17 circulars.

14:13

14:13

18  
19 The code of conduct and accountability for board  
20 members of, for example, Trusts, are to be found,  
21 members of the Inquiry, at TRU-113436. The issue of  
22 the code of conduct and accountability for board  
23 members is something we will turn to directly when  
24 discussing the Board.

14:14

14:14

25  
26 The strategic control framework within which the  
27 Southern Health and Social Care Trust is required to  
28 operate is set out in a financial memorandum between  
29 the Department and the Trust. The performance

1 Framework for the Trust is determined by the Department  
2 including key targets, standards and actions.

3  
4 The Inquiry will note that Mr. Wilson of the  
5 Department, who I referred to earlier, occupies a role 14:14  
6 within the secondary care directorate which is a  
7 directorate within the Healthcare Policy Group. His  
8 role is as a senior adviser to the Minister on matters  
9 related to secondary healthcare policy. He has  
10 referred the Inquiry to the standard policy brief for 14:15  
11 urology which was last reviewed by the Department in  
12 2019 and provides the Department's officials with  
13 accessible, factual, high-level information concerning  
14 the location of services, legislation, clinical  
15 guidelines and waiting lists. 14:15

16  
17 He has also explained that as required by Section 5 of  
18 the 2009 Act - that's the Reform Act - the Department  
19 produced the Health and Social Care Framework document  
20 in 2011 which describes the roles and function of the 14:15  
21 various health and social care bodies, the systems that  
22 govern their relationships with each other, so, for  
23 example, the PHA and HSCB or the HSCB and the Trusts,  
24 as well as the Department and the service commissioning  
25 process. 14:16

26  
27 Mr. Wilson acknowledges that the Department has a  
28 direct responsibility for the concerns that have arisen  
29 within urology at Southern Trust at a policy and

1 oversight level. He has highlighted the work which is  
2 already underway to identify a number of areas where  
3 revised policies and processes are necessary to  
4 mitigate or prevent a further recurrence of similar  
5 issues and risks and he explains the Department's 14:16  
6 commitment to bringing forward a number of reviews.  
7 However, he has acknowledged that the ability of the  
8 Department to address similar issues arising out of the  
9 Hyponatraemia and Neurology Inquiries has been  
10 constrained by budgetary consideration despite being 14:17  
11 Departmental priorities.

12  
13 The Southern Health and Social Care Trust:

14  
15 The Trust is an arm's length body of the Department. 14:17  
16 It is a statutory body which came into existence on 1st  
17 April 2007 under the Southern Health and Social Care  
18 Trust (Establishment) Order (Northern Ireland) 2006.  
19 The Trust is established for the purposes specified in  
20 Article 10(1) of the Health and Personal Services 14:17  
21 (Northern Ireland) Order 1991. These include any  
22 functions of the Department with respect to  
23 administration of health and social care that the  
24 Department may direct.

25 14:17  
26 Additionally, section 21 of the Reform Act - that's the  
27 2009 Act - provides that it is the duty of a Health and  
28 Social Care Trust to exercise its functions with the  
29 aim of improving the health and social wellbeing of and

1 reducing health inequalities between those for whom it  
2 provides or may provide health and social care.

3  
4 The Trust headquarters are based at the Southern  
5 College of Nursing, Craigavon Hospital in Portadown, 14:18  
6 County Armagh. The Trust provides health and social  
7 care services to the Armagh, Banbridge and Craigavon  
8 Council area, the Mid Ulster Council area, and the  
9 Newry, Mourne and Down Council area. The population  
10 served by the Trust is approximately 380,700 at the 14:18  
11 time of the last publication of population estimates in  
12 June 2021.

13  
14 The Trust is an integrated Health and Social Care Trust  
15 providing acute and community hospital services 14:19  
16 together with a range of community health and social  
17 services. The Trust's Management Statement from 2017  
18 and the Trust's Standing Orders can be found at  
19 TRU-01864 and TRU-01966 respectively.

20 14:19  
21 The Management Statement sets out the broad framework  
22 within which the Trust will operate, in particular, the  
23 Trust's overall aims, objectives and targets; the rules  
24 and guidance relevant to the exercise of the Trust's  
25 functions, duties and powers; the conditions under 14:19  
26 which any public funds are paid to the Trust and how  
27 the Trust is to be held to account for its performance.  
28 Its vision is to deliver safe, high-quality health and  
29 social care services respecting the dignity and

1 individuality of all who use them. It lists its core  
2 values as working together, excellence, openness,  
3 honesty and compassion.  
4

5 I will now provide a brief account of the Trust's  
6 budgetary and financial position.  
7

14:20

8 The following information has been drawn from the Draft  
9 Trust Annual Report and Accounts for the last financial  
10 year, 2021-2022, year ending 31st March.  
11

14:20

12 At the beginning of each financial year, the Trust  
13 prepares a detailed financial strategy which is  
14 approved by the Trust Board. This strategy forms the  
15 basis of how budgets are to be allocated across all  
16 directorates within the Trust. Financial performance  
17 is monitored and reviewed monthly with all directors  
18 and detailed financial reports and year-end forecasts  
19 are produced monthly for both the Trust Board and the  
20 Trust's senior management team.  
21

14:20

14:21

22 The Trust receives the vast majority of its income -  
23 that's some 88% - from the Department through the  
24 commissioning body - that's the HSCB for the purposes  
25 of our Terms of Reference, now called the SPPG. In  
26 addition, the Trust is provided with a funding  
27 allocation for medical education. The largest single  
28 remaining funding stream is the income derived from  
29 clients in residential and nursing homes.

14:21

1  
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29

The Trust's total revenue expenditure in the year I've just referred to was 993 million and that was directed as follows:

14:21

The vast majority, 389 million, going towards acute hospital services; 192 million to older people services; 180 million directed to mental health and disability services; and 107 million directed to children's services. Additionally, some 53 million was allocated to a range of supporting services.

14:22

Unsurprisingly, staff costs are consistently the largest component of expenditure accounting for 60% of operating expenditure. At the end of March 2022 the Trust employed 15,653 including staff with more than one post.

14:22

I should indicate, panel members, there is hopefully helpfully an appendix at C of your bundle behind my speaking note, which contains a list of the key post holders within the Trust which are relevant to the work of this Inquiry, and I thank Mr. Murphy for preparing that at late notice yesterday.

14:22

CHAIR: Thank you.

14:23

MR. WOLFE KC: Urology services within the Trust:

The Trust has been providing a urology service for patients living in the southern part of Northern

1 Ireland since 1992. Prior to 1992, fully-trained  
2 urologists were based at the Belfast City Hospital and  
3 the Royal Victoria Hospital here in Belfast. In 1992  
4 urologists were appointed to Craigavon, the Mater  
5 Hospital and Altnagelvin Hospitals. By 1999 there were 14:23  
6 ten full-time urologists in posts providing services on  
7 the above sites along with Lagan Valley and Coleraine  
8 Hospitals. In addition to these ten urologists, there  
9 were two consultant general surgeons, one based in the  
10 Mater and one based in the Ulster Hospital at Dundonald 14:23  
11 who were accredited as urologists and whose workload  
12 was increasingly in the field of urology.

13  
14 A review of adult urology services was published by the  
15 Health and Social Care Board in March 2009. You'll 14:24  
16 find that at WIT-50807.

17  
18 The aim of the review was to develop a modern,  
19 fit-for-purpose-in-21st-century reformed service model  
20 for adult urology services which takes account of 14:24  
21 relevant guidelines, including NICE, good practice,  
22 Royal College, BAUS and BAUN.

23  
24 The future model should ensure quality services are  
25 provided in the right place at the right time by the 14:24  
26 most appropriate clinician through the entire pathway  
27 from primary care to intermediate to secondary and  
28 tertiary care.

29



1 This review was to mark a significant change in the  
2 delivery of urology services in Northern Ireland. From  
3 1st January 2013 those services were built around a  
4 three-team model: Team East, Team North and a Team  
5 South based in the Southern Trust. 14:25

6 As part of this remodelling the Southern Trust or Team  
7 South took on responsibility for the provision of  
8 urology services to the population of County Fermanagh.

9 The review report argued that this reorganisation was  
10 necessary to achieve long-term stability and viability. 14:25

11 The statement of Mr. Wilson, amongst others, provides a  
12 high-level account of the review of urology services.

13 Some witnesses have commented in detail in relation to  
14 the impact of this review and there will be an  
15 opportunity to engage with this evidence, where 14:25  
16 necessary, in the public hearings.

17  
18 Concerns have been expressed to this Inquiry regarding  
19 resources which have been devoted to servicing this  
20 model. I note in reading Mr. O'Brien's statement 14:26  
21 recently that he spends a lot of time dealing with that  
22 aspect of this issue and I touch on aspects of it when  
23 I come to say something about him.

24  
25 Mr. Mark Haynes, a consultant urologist in the Southern 14:26  
26 Trust who joined urology team in May 2014 after the  
27 three-team model had been implemented contends that the  
28 service was effectively commissioned at a level where  
29 it would fail to meet the population need from its

1 inception and this gap would widen given the absence of  
2 projections related to increasing demand resulting from  
3 population and demographic changes. He claims that  
4 this is the pattern across urology in Northern Ireland  
5 and remains the case.

14:27

6 Mr. Haynes explains that the Trust's urology output  
7 does not exist as a separate self-contained entity.  
8 Rather, it is a service which sits within the Trust's  
9 acute directorate, and patient care is delivered across  
10 multiple sites, including Craigavon, Daisy Hill  
11 Hospital, South Tyrone Hospital, South West Acute  
12 Hospital and Banbridge Poly Clinic.

14:27

13  
14 The main setting for the provision of services is the  
15 Craigavon Hospital where services are provided by a  
16 team of consultants, urologists, clinical nurse  
17 specialists, staff nurses and allied health  
18 professionals, in addition to visiting radiographers  
19 and radiologists.

14:27

20  
21 The urology service provided at Craigavon encompasses  
22 the main facets of urological investigation and  
23 management with some notable exceptions including  
24 radical pelvic surgery, renal transplantation and  
25 associated vascular access surgery which are provided  
26 by the Regional Transplantation Service based in  
27 Belfast. Additionally, neonatal and infant urological  
28 surgery is provided by the Regional Paediatric Surgical  
29 Service in Belfast.

14:28

14:28

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The Trust has a purpose-built urology outpatient facility located in the Thorndale Unit. It is run by five clinical nurse specialists. Outpatients services at Craigavon include urodynamics, ultrasound, intravesical therapy, prostate biopsy and flexible cystoscopy. Craigavon Hospital has been designated as a cancer unit with its urological department being designated the urological cancer unit for the area's population. A wide spectrum of urological cancer management has been provided for some time. Outreach clinics are currently provided in a number of locations in the Southern Trust area.

14:28

14:28

Later in this opening statement I will explain the managerial structures within the urology service of the Trust. At this point it suffices to note that structurally the urology service is managed within the acute services directorate. On the operational side there's a head of service who acts as the direct link between the urology service and the staff members who manage individual areas and departments within the Trust where urological clinical activity is delivered.

14:29

14:29

She - and it has tended to be a she through recent appointments - provides operational day-to-day management with regards to the activities delivered by the urology team with support from the clinical lead for the service. The head of service is in turn

14:29

1           accountable to the Assistant Director for Surgery and  
2           Elective Care.

3  
4           The urology service has long been troubled by an  
5           inability to fill all available posts. As of September 14:30  
6           2022 there was a 2.2 person vacancy at consultant  
7           level, for example. The current interim Head of  
8           Service is Ms. Wendy Clayton. She has explained that  
9           these vacancies - and they're not just at the level of  
10          consultant - these vacancies have impacted on the 14:30  
11          provision, management and governance of urology  
12          services. She has highlighted, for example, that the  
13          inability of the Trust to fill its consultancy  
14          vacancies in urology which has resulted in a reduction  
15          in clinical activity which has in turn been a factor in 14:31  
16          the increased waiting times.

17  
18          Additionally, the pressures on the current group of  
19          consultants, and perhaps for some time before, has  
20          increased so that, for example, they're required to 14:31  
21          cover the urologist of the weak service more frequently  
22          and that in turn has an adverse impact on the time  
23          spent in theatre and in clinic.

24  
25          Understandably, the inability to meet demands leads to 14:31  
26          ongoing patient complaints and challenges which have to  
27          be managed. The waiting list statistics for urology in  
28          the Trust provide us with a striking demonstration of  
29          the pressures faced by the urology service.

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The commissioning plan directions score care shows that as of 31st January of this year, 5,530 people were on the Trust urology outpatient waiting list. Integrated elective access protocol, which you will hear frequent mention of during the life of this Inquiry, the IEAP, provides an outline of the approved procedures, including a time limit, target time limit I should say, for managing elective referrals to first definitive treatment or discharge. It was first introduced on 9th May 2008 and has been updated as recently as June 2020.

14:32  
14:32

The IEAP target for outpatient appointments is nine weeks but as of January 2022, 4,869 patients had been waiting for longer with the vast majority, 3,763, waiting for more than a year. The longest wait was staggeringly 313 weeks or six years.

14:32

The situation has rapidly deteriorated over the past several years. In 2016 some 2,040 were waiting more than the nine-week target but most patients were seen inside a year. But by March 2019, that had jumped to almost 2,000 patients waiting for more than a year and has continued to climb ever since.

14:33

The position is little better when considering the prospects for patients on the inpatient day case waiting list for urology. Here, the IEAP target is 13 weeks but as of 31st January 2022, 2,086 patients were

14:33

1 on the waiting list with more than 80% - that is 1,737  
2 - not treated by that target date and many - 1,263 -  
3 waiting for more than 12 months.

4  
5 Again, the trend of waiting times for surgery has 14:34  
6 followed that for outpatient appointments and has been  
7 one of exponential increases since 2016. In that year,  
8 2016, more than 50% of patients were treated inside the  
9 13-week target, although 301 were waiting for more than  
10 52 weeks. But by March 2020, those waiting in excess 14:34  
11 of a year had more than trebled to 934 and, as I say,  
12 it's much worse today.

13  
14 There has been and there remains a very significant  
15 capacity demand mismatch. The figures made available 14:35  
16 to the Inquiry show that commissioned output activity  
17 has remained stationary at 299 cases per month for  
18 several years, but that the population demand far  
19 outstrips this sitting at an average of more than 400  
20 cases per month in every year, bar the Covid-affected 14:35  
21 year of 2021. Therefore, the variance of capacity gap  
22 for the Trust has sat at an average of 159 cases per  
23 month over a six-year period.

24  
25 A number of initiatives have been pursued by the Trust 14:35  
26 in an effort to mitigate these waiting list pressures.  
27 Ms. Clayton has referred to the use of independent  
28 sector providers who address new outpatient referrals  
29 and to perform a small number of TURP procedures. On

1 occasion it has been possible to transfer patients to  
2 neighbouring Trusts with shorter waiting times.  
3 Mr. Haynes has explained that the Trust has tried to  
4 grapple with incoming demand by engaging with the HSCB  
5 to reach agreement for new referrals from some 14:36  
6 population centres to be treated, for example, in the  
7 Western Trust area where waiting times are shorter.  
8 Nevertheless, he has explained that his urology  
9 colleagues so frequently see patients come to harm  
10 while awaiting surgery, that it is almost normalised. 14:36  
11 He makes the point that patients languishing on routine  
12 waiting lists simply do not get treatment while urgent,  
13 non-cancer cases often wait many years.  
14  
15 It is clear that resources have had to be targeted as 14:37  
16 prioritising the treatment of cancer patients but even  
17 cancer patients have been adversely affected by  
18 resources issues. Ms. Clayton has highlighted that  
19 IEAP target for a red flag outpatient first appointment  
20 is 14 days. However, Trust performance measured 14:37  
21 against that target in April 2016 was 3.5 weeks and has  
22 rapidly deteriorated; five to seven weeks by April 2019  
23 and 11 weeks as of 1st April this year.  
24  
25 The problem is not limited to the Southern Trust and it 14:37  
26 is of note that in his role as Chair of the NICaN  
27 Clinical Reference Group, Mr. Haynes wrote to the HSCB  
28 in October 2019 to set out that group's concern that  
29 urological cancer surgeons could not consistently offer

1 surgery within expected timescales for cancer treatment  
2 and that increasingly difficult choices were having to  
3 be made when prioritising cancer treatments. In  
4 practice this means inevitably delaying some patients'  
5 cancer treatment in order to expedite another patient's 14:38  
6 treatment. If treatment is delayed, Mr. Haynes  
7 indicates there is a risk of progression and  
8 complication and a need for additional interventions,  
9 thereby placing a greater demand on the healthcare  
10 system. Clearly a vicious circle. 14:38

11  
12 The Inquiry is, therefore, acutely aware that the  
13 context in which dedicated clinicians, nursing staff,  
14 allied health professionals and managers seek to  
15 deliver a urology service in the Southern Trust is very 14:39  
16 far from optimal. As I have already indicated, the  
17 Inquiry will wish to evaluate to what extent the impact  
18 of working under great pressure to meet demand impacts  
19 upon service delivery.

20 14:39  
21 Mr. Haynes, for example, has suggested at the very  
22 least the workload pressures which exist in attempting  
23 to deliver a service in the absence of adequate  
24 resources impacts on the likelihood of individuals  
25 working within the service to identify and raise 14:39  
26 concerns. This is a significant intervention. It is  
27 one which the Inquiry will wish to explore with him  
28 when he gives evidence next week.  
29



1 The Trust Board, the Southern Trust Board:

2  
3 The Southern Trust Board has corporate responsibility  
4 for ensuring that the Trust fulfills the aims and  
5 objectives set by the Department. The Board 14:40  
6 establishes the overall strategic direction of the  
7 Trust and should constructively challenge the Trust's  
8 Executives team in their planning, target-setting and  
9 delivery of performance, ensure the Department is kept  
10 informed of any change likely to impact the strategic 14:40  
11 direction of the Trust, and should demonstrate high  
12 standards of corporate governance at all times.

13  
14 The Board is comprised of a non-executive Chair, seven  
15 non-executive members made up of six lay persons and a 14:40  
16 layperson with a financial experience and up to five  
17 executive members, usually comprising the Chief  
18 Executive, Director of Finance, Medical Director,  
19 Director of Nursing and Director of Social Work.  
20 Members are expected to consider the key strategic and 14:41  
21 managerial issues facing the Trust in carrying out its  
22 statutory and other functions.

23  
24 The Chair of the Board is responsible for leading the  
25 Board, for working closely with the Chief Executive and 14:41  
26 is accountable to the Minister. The Chair ensures that  
27 the Trust's policies support the strategic policies of  
28 the Minister. The Chair and Trust board members share  
29 corporate responsibility and ensure the Trust fulfills

1 the aims and objectives set by the Department and  
2 Minister. The Chair ensures risk management is  
3 considered regularly and formally at board meetings and  
4 ensures the Board meets regularly throughout the year  
5 and has minutes recorded, including, where appropriate, 14:41  
6 the views of individual board members.

7  
8 Mrs. Roberta Brownlee was the Chair throughout most of  
9 the period with which we are concerned. She was  
10 succeeded by Ms. Eileen Mullen at the start of 2021. 14:42  
11

12 The Board appoints a Chief Executive to the Trust. As  
13 I have noted already, the Chief Executive is the  
14 Trust's accounting officer. The Chief Executive is  
15 responsible for the overall performance of the 14:42  
16 executive functions of the Trust and is directly  
17 accountable to the Chair and non-executive members of  
18 the Board for ensuring Board decisions are implemented.  
19

20 The Chief Executive deals with the operational delivery 14:42  
21 of the Trust, advises the Trust Board on the discharge  
22 of its responsibilities, the Trust's performance  
23 against its aims and objectives and ensures risk  
24 management is maintained and ensures that effective  
25 procedures for handling complaints about the Trust are 14:42  
26 well established and widely disseminated.

27  
28 The Trust has experienced a high degree of turnover in  
29 the Chief Executive's office. The Chief Executive at

1 present is Dr. Maria O'Kane and she succeeded Mr. Shane  
2 Devlin at the start of this year. The Inquiry will  
3 wish to consider the turnover of Chief Executives  
4 within the Trust and to consider whether the impact  
5 that this may have had on the continuity and  
6 effectiveness of governance systems. 14:43

7  
8 The Trust has professional executive directors for  
9 medical, nursing and allied health professionals and  
10 social work who are each responsible for professional 14:43  
11 standards of practice within their respective fields.  
12 Each directors reports to the Trust Board on  
13 professional governance issues. Executive members or  
14 senior members of Trust staff are appointed to lead  
15 each of its major professional and corporate functions. 14:43  
16 The Medical Director, for example, has executive  
17 responsibility for all professional medical issues.

18  
19 The management statement between the Department and the  
20 Trust sets out the broad framework within which the 14:44  
21 Trust will operate, including the Trust's aims,  
22 objectives and targets in support of the Department's  
23 wider strategic aims; the rules and guidelines relevant  
24 to the exercise of the Trust's functions; duties and  
25 powers; conditions for public funds; and how the Trust 14:44  
26 is held to account for its performance.

27  
28 The Board holds approximately seven meetings per year.  
29 The majority of meetings involve a public and a

1 confidential session. The confidential session is held  
2 at the beginning of the meeting and is closed to the  
3 public. Mr. Devlin, who I've explained is the former  
4 Chief Executive of the Trust, has indicated that this  
5 private session or confidential session allows for the 14:44  
6 sharing of information on concerns or performance  
7 issues that are identified to be raised and discussed  
8 directly with Trust board members. He further explains  
9 that these confidential meetings are minuted to ensure  
10 an accurate record but they're not held in public 14:45  
11 session so that issues of policy and development are  
12 confidential in terms of identifiable information can  
13 be shared.

14  
15 A separate agenda is prepared for the public and 14:45  
16 confidential sections of the meeting and separate  
17 meeting packs of documentation are prepared for  
18 members. There are packs of documentation provided to  
19 the Trust Board for each meeting. The Inquiry has  
20 considered these packs which contain a variety of 14:45  
21 different papers prepared by various members of the  
22 Board, committees, or external individual agencies.

23  
24 It is difficult to ascertain the intensity of the  
25 discussion which takes place at board meetings. The 14:45  
26 Trust Board minutes are not detailed in nature. It is  
27 unclear if the Trust Board minutes accurately reflect  
28 the full extent of discussion and challenge at meetings  
29 and this is a matter which the Inquiry may wish to

1 explore in evidence.

2  
3 The volume of documentation provided in these packs may  
4 be a relevant fact to consider in exploring the extent  
5 of engaged engagement with the issues raised at Trust 14:46  
6 board meetings. It appears from our consideration of  
7 the packs that it would not be unusual for the meeting  
8 packs to extend to more than 800 pages of material. It  
9 is unclear how far in advance of the meeting these  
10 packs are provided to the Trust Board members. 14:46

11  
12 Mr. Devlin has explained that the public Trust Board  
13 agenda is structured under three key domains:  
14 Strategy, accountability and culture. It is not  
15 apparent from the Trust Board minutes how much time is 14:47  
16 spent on each part of the agenda. Mr. Devlin suggested  
17 the Board agenda is regularly 60% discussion of  
18 clinical governance issues. If this is accurate, it  
19 would indicate that clinical governance was a prominent  
20 feature of the Board's discussions. Regardless of the 14:47  
21 time spent by the Board on discussing clinical  
22 governance matters, however, the Inquiry will be  
23 interested to explore whether those discussions  
24 adequately focused on addressing issues of concern and  
25 whether the overall site of clinical governance was 14:47  
26 effective.

27  
28 The Board minutes and agendas disclose that at the  
29 commencement of Trust board meetings an opportunity is

1 provided for those present to declare any conflict of  
2 interest.

3  
4 Furthermore, the Inquiry is aware of occasions when  
5 board members have been reminded of their obligations 14:48  
6 under the codes of conduct and accountability. For  
7 example, on 24th March 2017, the Department wrote to  
8 all of the Health and Social Care Boards and arm's  
9 length bodies to remind their members of their  
10 obligations under the codes and their requirement to 14:48  
11 identify and manage any conflict of interest in order  
12 to maintain the integrity of the Board and public  
13 confidence within it.

14  
15 One issue of particular concern to the Inquiry relates 14:48  
16 to whether the former Chair of the Trust Board,  
17 Mrs. Roberta Brownlee, properly discharged her duties  
18 under the codes. At the meetings on 24th September  
19 2020 and 12th November 2020, Mrs. Brownlee declared an  
20 interest in an agenda item involving Mr. O'Brien and 14:48  
21 left the room when the item was discussed. The nature  
22 of the conflict is not otherwise elaborated upon in the  
23 minutes. However, the minutes of board meetings  
24 indicate that she did not always disclose a conflict of  
25 interest when issues relating to Mr. O'Brien were 14:49  
26 discussed. She attended meetings on 27th August 2020  
27 and 22nd October 2020 when issues of concern relating  
28 to Mr. O'Brien were reported. The minutes of the  
29 latter meeting show that she actively engaged in the

1 discussion regarding the update on clinical concerns  
2 within urology which related to Mr. O'Brien. It is  
3 unclear why the declaration of a conflict was not made  
4 at the August and October meetings when it was made at  
5 the September and November meetings.

14:49

6 Mr. Devlin has told the Inquiry that he had concerns  
7 about Mrs. Brownlee's approach and has questioned her  
8 "total commitment to be totally open with regards to  
9 her willingness to criticise urology and specifically  
10 Mr. O'Brien." Mr. Devlin contends that at the meeting  
11 of 22nd October 2020, Mrs. Brownlee advocated on  
12 Mr. O'Brien's behalf. Concerns about the role of  
13 Mrs. Brownlee have been expressed by other witnesses,  
14 including, for example, Mrs. Corrigan.

14:50

15  
16 Mrs. Brownlee has been served with a Section 21 notice  
17 by the Inquiry but in fairness to her I must point out  
18 that the deadline for compliance with that notice has  
19 not yet expired. In the circumstances, it was thought  
20 appropriate to alert her legal representative to the  
21 fact that this issue would be ventilated as part of  
22 this opening statement and to offer Mrs. Brownlee the  
23 opportunity to respond. In doing so, it was explained  
24 to the legal representative that it was necessary to  
25 raise this matter publicly since it is an issue which  
26 the Inquiry is bound to consider but that of course no  
27 finding has been made by the Inquiry at this time.

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14:50

14:51

28  
29 It is important to state that Mrs. Brownlee has now

1 responded, through her legal representative, and it has  
2 been indicated to the Inquiry that she refutes any  
3 suggestion of impropriety and she has asserted that she  
4 exercised her duties as Chair of the Southern Trust in  
5 an appropriate manner for the entirety of her tenure. 14:51  
6 She is currently gathering evidence to support her  
7 position and this will be provided for the  
8 consideration of the Inquiry in due course.

9  
10 These are serious and significant allegations and the 14:52  
11 Inquiry will want to carefully consider whether the  
12 claims that had been made about Mrs. Brownlee are well  
13 founded. The Inquiry itself directs no allegation  
14 against Mrs. Brownlee and no criticism is made of her.  
15 These are issues to be explored through the evidence. 14:52  
16 Hypothetically, if the Inquiry was to find that there's  
17 some merit in the claims which have been made about  
18 her, then - and only then - will it become important to  
19 consider what impact, if any, this had on the approach  
20 adopted by the Trust to issues involving Mr. O'Brien. 14:52

21  
22 The Inquiry will note that notwithstanding his concerns  
23 in relation to Mrs. Brownlee, Mr. Devlin does not  
24 believe that this has any impact on the path that was  
25 followed with Mr. O'Brien's case or with urology. 14:52  
26

27 The Board of the Trust appoints committees to support  
28 it in fulfilling its functions effectively. The  
29 minutes and reports of all Board committee meetings



1 shall be brought to the public board meeting for  
2 information immediately following committee approval,  
3 except where confidentiality needs to be expressly  
4 protected. The senior management team is represented  
5 on each such committee. The Trust Board packs contain 14:53  
6 minutes and reports of the meetings of the following  
7 committees: The Audit Committee, the Endowments  
8 Committee, the Governance Committee, the Patient and  
9 Client Experience Committee and the Performance  
10 Committee. In general, there is limited evidence 14:53  
11 within the minutes of the Board meetings to suggest  
12 that the work of the committees is discussed in detail  
13 or that further information is sought by the Trust  
14 Board about matters raised at committee. The time set  
15 aside to discuss the work of the committees does not 14:54  
16 appear to be extensive. Indeed, the minutes for the  
17 Board meeting on 24th October 2019 show that a new  
18 standardised format for dealing with sub-committee  
19 business was introduced so that each committee report  
20 would be taken as read and not further discussed unless 14:54  
21 an urgent issue arises.

22  
23 The Inquiry may consider that these committees are  
24 central to the effective operation of the governance  
25 framework at board level and that, therefore, it might 14:54  
26 be expected that the full board would take an active  
27 interest in discussing what they're producing. If  
28 there was this active interest, it might be expected  
29 that the Board minutes would reflect back to the

1 committee some areas of concern, requests for  
2 clarification or assurance, questions to be addressed  
3 for the next meeting, specific issues to be further  
4 examined or investigated by a committee.

5  
6 The Inquiry will explore the approach taken by the  
7 Trust Board to the work of governance-related  
8 committees in the reports or minutes and whether, in  
9 particular, there's evidence of the Board engaging in a  
10 meaningful discussion, intervention or debate about the  
11 issues considered by the committees. 14:55

12  
13 The Trust Board was familiar with the challenges faced  
14 by its urology service. This can be discerned from  
15 consideration of the Trust minutes. The material 14:55  
16 disclosed to the Inquiry by the Trust indicates that  
17 the service was considered to present the greatest or  
18 certainly one of the greatest risks to the operational  
19 performance of the Trust. Capacity issues were  
20 discussed very frequently at board meetings or were 14:56  
21 otherwise documented in committee reports, and I refer  
22 in my speaking note to a number of examples of that.

23  
24 At a meeting in March 2016, for example, the Trust  
25 Board was advised that the longest Trust waits are in 14:56  
26 urology with 34 patients waiting from 2012-13; in  
27 January 2017 the Trust Board was told that the majority  
28 of breaches of the 62-day waiting target are within  
29 urology; in January 2019 the Trust Board was advised

1 that the longest wait in terms of inpatient and  
2 day-case waits are within urology.

3  
4 These are just some indications that the Board was  
5 anxious to discuss these challenges. Sorry, I'll 14:57  
6 repeat that sentence. There are some indications that  
7 the Trust Board was anxious to discuss these  
8 challenges.

9  
10 By way of further example, the minutes of the Board 14:57  
11 meeting for 30th August 2012 indicate that the Chair  
12 informed members that at the request of the  
13 non-executive directors more time will be devoted to  
14 discussion on the performance report at Trust board  
15 meetings going forward. At the meeting seven years 14:57  
16 later, on 24th January 2019, by way of further example,  
17 board members discussed urology waiting times and  
18 sought assurance that controls were in place.  
19 Nevertheless, the degree of intervention may have been  
20 piecemeal and intermittent. 14:57

21  
22 I have already raised a question concerning the degree  
23 to which the Board exhibited interest in the work of  
24 its committees? One example of a committee discussion  
25 concerning urology can be found within the Trust Board 14:58  
26 pack for the meeting of 24th October 2019. A report  
27 prepared by the Chair of the Patient and Client  
28 Experience Committee disclosed that the committee had  
29 considered a presentation highlighting work in urology.

1 It noted the challenges to the service and the real  
2 impact of performance figures on service users. The  
3 minutes of the Board meeting indicate that one of the  
4 non-executive directors, Mr. John Wilkinson, presented  
5 the committee report but the same minutes do not  
6 suggest that any substantive discussion took place.  
7 There's no indication that the issues raised in the  
8 committee report were interrogated or challenged or  
9 that further clarification or assurance was sought.

14:58

10  
11 The Inquiry is unaware of any Board sub-committee  
12 discussion relating to the particular issues concerning  
13 the performance of Mr. O'Brien. Generally speaking,  
14 while committee minutes and reports contain references  
15 to concerns about operational capacity and delivery  
16 within urology services, it is the Inquiry's current  
17 understanding that concerns relating to Mr. O'Brien,  
18 which were known and discussed operationally, were not  
19 drawn to the attention of any committee until after  
20 matters were brought to the attention of the Department  
21 by the early alert in July 2020 when they were then  
22 discussed at a governance committee meeting of the  
23 Board in November of that year.

14:59

14:59

14:59

24  
25 It is also the Inquiry's understanding that the first  
26 occasion on which the Trust Board was informed of an  
27 issue relating to Mr. O'Brien's clinical practice was  
28 on 30th September 2010. At that time, Dr. Rankin, who  
29 I understand was the Medical Director - we maybe need

14:59

1 to check that - advised the Board by reference to a  
2 briefing note that the Health and Social Care Board had  
3 raised concerns relating to the use of IV fluids and  
4 antibiotics in the treatment of patients with urinary  
5 tract infections and at the higher level than usual 15:00  
6 rate of benign cystectomy was being carried out in the  
7 Trust. The briefing note referred to the involvement  
8 of two surgeons, one of whom was Mr. O'Brien, although  
9 neither clinician was identified. The meeting was told  
10 that a review had commenced. 15:00

11  
12 At the next meeting on 25th November 2010, the Trust  
13 Board was advised that the review had been completed  
14 with 13 patients but that it had been decided to  
15 undertake a review of the whole original cohort of 15:01  
16 patients which would take several more weeks to  
17 complete. The minutes of the Board meeting do not  
18 suggest that members raised any questions or sought any  
19 further information. The minutes do not suggest that  
20 board members asked about any possible wider 15:01  
21 ramifications or about any other compliance or  
22 management issues within the Urology Department  
23 involving these clinicians. No further update appears  
24 to have been given to the Board following the meeting  
25 of 25th November 2010 and there's no indication that 15:01  
26 any board member asked for an update.

27  
28 The Inquiry is unaware of any further board discussion  
29 of the practices of Mr. O'Brien until a meeting of 27th

1 January 2017, just under seven years later. The  
2 minutes for that meeting referred to an unnamed  
3 consultant urologist who had been excluded from  
4 practice for a four-week period who could now return to  
5 work subject to a number of controls and who would now 15:02  
6 be investigated using the MHPS Framework. Given the  
7 seriousness of the facts conveyed to the Trust Board,  
8 the Inquiry may be concerned to understand why the  
9 Trust Board was not provided with any form of  
10 documentation which set out the detail of the 15:02  
11 circumstances that had led to Mr. O'Brien's exclusion,  
12 the decision to instigate the MHPS process, or the  
13 decision to permit him to return to work.

14  
15 Furthermore, the Inquiry will be concerned that the 15:02  
16 Trust Board does not appear to have been provided with  
17 any information about the nature of the concerns raised  
18 in respect of Mr. O'Brien nor any detail about the  
19 controls that had been put in place.

20 15:03  
21 It is appropriate to observe at that time that  
22 Mr. John Wilkinson had been assigned to the MHPS  
23 process in accordance with the framework and will have  
24 been in a position to ask further questions of those  
25 involved. You'll recall Mr. Wilkinson was a 15:03  
26 non-executive director of the Board, so he was the  
27 Board person attached to the MHPS process.

28  
29 In that role he was familiar with at least some of the

1 significant developments. Furthermore, as Chief  
2 Executive, Mr. Devlin was also a board member.

3  
4 The MHPS case manager met with Mr. Devlin on a number  
5 of occasions and made him aware of the conclusions 15:03  
6 reached by the MHPS process. So far as the Inquiry is  
7 aware, there is no indication that Mr. Devlin or  
8 Mr. Wilkinson or indeed the Medical Director took steps  
9 at any time to update the Board in connection with the  
10 MHPS process. 15:04

11  
12 For that matter there's no indication, either, that the  
13 Board took any steps of its motion to follow up on the  
14 information provided in early 2017 in order to chart  
15 the progress of the MHPS investigation and its outcome, 15:04  
16 the continued performance of the clinician involved or  
17 patient safety issues. The Inquiry will wish to  
18 consider why further information on such matters,  
19 including information concerning the referral of  
20 Mr. O'Brien to the GMC in 2019, information on Serious 15:04  
21 Adverse Incidents and departures from his work plan  
22 were not brought to the Board, and whether the Board's  
23 lack of pro-activity around these issues raises any  
24 concerns.

25 15:05  
26 Mr. Devlin has provided the Inquiry with three examples  
27 of matters that were escalated to the Trust Board where  
28 there have been patient quality and safety concerns. I  
29 won't deal with the detail of those examples now but

1 what he says of those details is as follows:

2  
3 They reveal clear engagement, challenge, planning and  
4 improvement on the part of the Board. The Inquiry may  
5 be interested to explore these examples in greater 15:05  
6 detail and to consider whether they do in fact reveal a  
7 willingness on the part of the Board to engage,  
8 challenge, plan and improve and whether a similar  
9 approach was or ought to have been applied in  
10 connection with Mr. O'Brien after January 2017. 15:06

11  
12 The next Board discussion in connection with  
13 Mr. O'Brien after the January 2017 discussion did not  
14 occur until 27th August 2020, more than three years  
15 later, when the minutes record that Dr. O'Kane brought 15:06  
16 to the Board's attention the fact that Serious Adverse  
17 Incident investigations were taking place into concerns  
18 involving "a recently retired consultant urologist".  
19 The minutes do not reflect the fact that the Trust had  
20 issued by that stage an early alert to the Department a 15:06  
21 month earlier. The Inquiry may be concerned to  
22 understand the rationale for the extremely limited  
23 terms in which the issues were reported to the Trust  
24 Board at that stage.

25 15:07  
26 It can be said, however, that a detailed report setting  
27 out both the history of issues in relation to  
28 Mr. O'Brien and the more recent concerns which had  
29 emerged was prepared by Dr. O'Kane for the Board



1 meeting on 24th September 2020. Within this report,  
2 Dr. O'Kane refers to the fact that an early alert had  
3 been made to the Department but the date of the early  
4 alert was not mentioned. The minutes of the meeting  
5 disclosed that a Trust member requested this  
6 information but the Chief Executive, for whatever  
7 reason, Mr. Devlin, was not in a position to provide  
8 the information but undertook to provide it. It may  
9 appear surprising that the early alert had not been  
10 provided to the Board at its previous meeting.

15:07

15:07

11  
12 Further board meetings took place on 22nd October 2020  
13 and 12th November 2020 at which the fallout from the  
14 early alert was again discussed. Mrs. Brownlee  
15 attended her last meeting as Chair on 12th November.  
16 Shortly thereafter, the Minister announced his decision  
17 to instigate this public inquiry.

15:08

18  
19 I want to move on now and discuss Mr. O'Brien.

15:08

20  
21 Mr. Aidan O'Brien graduated from Queens University  
22 Belfast in 1978. After undertaking postgraduate  
23 surgical training in Northern Ireland, he was appointed  
24 as a registrar in urology in Belfast City Hospital in  
25 1984; St. James's Hospital, Dublin, in 1985; in 1986 he  
26 was appointed research fellow with Meath Hospital; a  
27 senior registrar in 1988 and he went on to complete  
28 higher surgical training in urology on 30th June 1991.  
29 He was then appointed senior registrar in paediatric

15:08

1 urology at the Royal Hospital for Sick Children in  
2 Bristol on 1st September 1991. In a two-month interval  
3 prior to taking up this post in Bristol, Mr. O'Brien  
4 served as a locum consultant at Craigavon Area Hospital  
5 for some seven weeks primarily performing TURP 15:09  
6 procedures. After competitive interview, Mr. O'Brien  
7 returned to Craigavon to take up post as consultant  
8 urologist on 6th July 1992. He worked in that capacity  
9 until July 2020 when he retired.

10  
11 In his detailed response to the MHPS investigation,  
12 which I will examine later in this opening, Mr. O'Brien  
13 provides a helpful description of the developments in  
14 the urology services in Craigavon from when he took up  
15 his post. At the time of his appointment the only 15:09  
16 specialist urology service in Northern Ireland was  
17 provided by Belfast City Hospital and urology provision  
18 was minimal at Craigavon. He explains that it focused  
19 mainly on carrying out TURP procedures. In the view of  
20 Mrs. Gishkori, that is G-i-s-h-k-o-r-i, in the view of 15:10  
21 Mrs. Gishkori, former Director of Acute Services,  
22 Mr. O'Brien built up urology services in the Trust  
23 "single handedly". Mr. O'Brien was a sole consultant  
24 for four years, a period which he has described as  
25 difficult when he was responsible for providing 24/7 15:10  
26 emergency urological services 48 weeks a year until the  
27 appointment of a Mr. Baluch in 1996 who was replaced by  
28 Mr. Young in 1998.  
29

1 Mr. O'Brien has reflected that the appointment of a  
2 second consultant was a necessity at that time as it  
3 had otherwise become impossible for a single consultant  
4 urologist to provide an adequate service to meet the  
5 increasing urological needs of the population. 15:11

6 Mr. O'Brien suggests that the urological department at  
7 Craigavon Hospital had been remarkably successful in  
8 its first decade and was widely recognised throughout  
9 Northern Ireland for being so.

10  
11 He has expressed the view that this led to some envious  
12 resentment from other departments which has  
13 subsequently led to a long delay in further  
14 desperately-needed development of the service, the loss  
15 of the single urology inpatient department in Ward 2 15:11  
16 South and radical pelvic surgery being centralised in  
17 Belfast City Hospital.

18  
19 Mr. O'Brien has explained that despite the expansion in  
20 the number of consultants employed at what had become 15:11  
21 the Southern Trust, there were enormous difficulties in  
22 meeting demand. He explains that the operating  
23 capacity allocated to the urological service had not  
24 been correspondingly increased in response to the  
25 number of referrals which accumulated annually, leading 15:12  
26 to increased waiting times for surgery.

27  
28 In light of concerns over waiting times, Mr. O'Brien  
29 undertook extended operation days, operating until

1 8:00 p.m. each Wednesday which he says was usually  
2 followed by a minimum of four hours further work  
3 preparing for MDM meetings ahead of the next day.  
4

5 In a submission made for the purposes of the formal 15:12  
6 grievance which he raised at the conclusion of the MHPS  
7 process in December 2018, Mr. O'Brien outlines that the  
8 demands on his time became more acute owing to

9 additional pressures that built up between 2012 and  
10 2016. Here he points to a reduction in his 15:13

11 patient-related administration time to two hours per  
12 week by 2016, his appointment as a lead clinician of  
13 the Southern Trust Urology NDT and Chair of the Urology  
14 MDM in April 2012. He indicates that his duties in the  
15 latter role, that is as Chair of the MDM, required him 15:13

16 to chair 137 meetings which necessitated a  
17 conservatively estimated 480 hours additional work or  
18 additional administration work undertaken in his own  
19 time, in addition to the need to take steps to prepare  
20 the urological oncology service for national peer 15:13  
21 review in June 2015.  
22

23 Mr. O'Brien outlines that despite raising these  
24 pressures with the Head of Service, Mrs. Corrigan, on  
25 more than one occasion, no remedial or supportive plan 15:14  
26 or action was put in place to alleviate him of this  
27 overwhelming burden which gave rise to an  
28 administrative backlog in terms of dictation of letters  
29 and which became a subject of concern.

1  
2 In the material disclosed to the Inquiry by  
3 Mr. O'Brien, he provides a perspective on some of the  
4 arrangements which were implemented in the Trust to  
5 support the delivery of urology services. Mr. O'Brien 15:14  
6 outlines that the urologist of the week system was  
7 introduced in 2014 and that it was agreed that the duty  
8 consultant would be responsible for the triage of  
9 referrals. He recounts how shortly after the  
10 introduction of this arrangement, he realised that 15:15  
11 there simply was not enough time to do triage  
12 effectively and optimally whilst also delivering  
13 optimal, definitive and timely management to those  
14 patients who had been acutely admitted. Mr. O'Brien  
15 believed that the primary purpose of the urologist of 15:15  
16 the week is to optimally care for those patients  
17 acutely admitted and it was not possible to accommodate  
18 the triage of an average 160 referrals a week without  
19 compromising the standard of care provided as urologist  
20 of the week, or compromising the standard of triage, or 15:15  
21 both.

22  
23 As I will explain in the course of this opening  
24 statement, what the Trust regarded as Mr. O'Brien's  
25 failure to perform triage on urgent and routine 15:16  
26 referrals, and the implications of this for the safe  
27 management of patients was to be the trigger for a  
28 number of Serious Adverse Incident reviews and in  
29 substantial part the MHPS investigation. At the point

1 when the Trust decided to initiate this investigation,  
2 Mr. O'Brien was formally excluded from the workplace  
3 for four weeks.

4  
5 Upon his return to work in February 2017 a monitoring 15:16  
6 arrangement was put in place by the Trust to seek to  
7 ensure compliance with, for example, his duty to  
8 triage.

9  
10 Mr. O'Brien has outlined in his grievance submission 15:16  
11 that from that time he was only able to triage in a  
12 timely manner by taking a day of annual leave after  
13 completing each period as urologist of the week. He  
14 describes this commitment as amounting to up to 65  
15 virtual consultations with patients, advising them of 15:17  
16 investigations requested and treatment to be initiated,  
17 in addition to dictating letters to referrers, GPs and  
18 patients. He adds that this has been equivalent to  
19 conducting up to nine additional new patient clinics  
20 while urologist of the week and during his role as 15:17  
21 urologist of the week.

22  
23 It is Mr. O'Brien's perspective that the inclusion of  
24 this requirement to triage within this role has  
25 compromised patient management and that it was 15:17  
26 therefore unsafe. Mr. O'Brien is on record as having  
27 described the triage performed by some of his  
28 consultant colleagues as unsafe and inadequate and that  
29 those undertaking triage, while being urologist of the

1 week, has resulted in triage being conducted instead of  
2 patient management leading to suboptimal outcomes.

3  
4 Mr. O'Brien was a supporter of advanced triage, a  
5 position he would contend which was necessitated by the 15:18  
6 waiting times for first appointment for routine and  
7 urgent referrals. He considered that these waiting  
8 times were so lengthy that to allow that time to  
9 elapse, without having directed some further  
10 investigation, can lead to a compromised outcome. 15:18

11  
12 As outlined in an interview conducted with him during  
13 the MHPS investigation, Mr. O'Brien was unable to  
14 secure agreement of his colleagues to adopt an advance  
15 system of triage and, in his view, the Trust failed to 15:18  
16 supply appropriate time to ensure that this crucial  
17 task was completed.

18  
19 Mr. O'Brien has described 2016 as a difficult year for  
20 several reasons, most notably his increasing concern 15:19  
21 about the morbidity and mortality of patients waiting  
22 ever-longer periods of time. His refusal or inability  
23 to take leave in an endeavour to mitigate, so far as  
24 possible, the risk of harm to patients, his own  
25 deteriorating health necessitating surgery in the 15:19  
26 latter part of that year, and the need to provide  
27 support to a colleague.

28  
29 Mr. O'Brien has indicated that while recuperating from

1 surgery, he was able to use his time to reduce  
2 significantly the backlog of undictated clinical  
3 correspondence which had built up associated with his  
4 outpatient clinics.

5  
6 During this period, on 30th December 2016 Mr. O'Brien  
7 was informed of concerns about his practice by the then  
8 Medical Director, Dr. Wright. He has described this  
9 development, which was to precipitate his temporary  
10 exclusion from practice and the launch of the MHPS  
11 investigation, as shocking and devastating and he has  
12 recalled that it initiated the worst month of his life  
13 with serious consequences for his health.

14  
15 In his response to the Inquiry's Section 21 notice,  
16 Mr. O'Brien has further reflected his concern and  
17 disappointment on what led up to these developments and  
18 he has argued that what has happened since then has  
19 lacked candour and honesty with regard to the treatment  
20 of him. He says:

21  
22 "I had always felt that the urological, medical and  
23 nursing staff had worked well together, enjoyed good  
24 relations with each other and were supportive of each  
25 other in endeavouring to provide the best care that  
26 they could provide to those in most of it, even though  
27 a severely inadequate service had been commissioned and  
28 resourced as described throughout his response."  
29



1           However, he says, that he found it disappointing to  
2           learn that a colleague could initiate a Serious Adverse  
3           Incident investigation concerning Patient 10 in 2006,  
4           that should read 2016, without ever being informed of  
5           it and having it chaired by another colleague, without 15:21  
6           ever having been consulted about it. Since then,  
7           Mr. O'Brien says, he has increasingly listened to  
8           criticisms of colleagues without these colleagues being  
9           aware of the criticisms and since then he has found the  
10          absence of candour, honesty and integrity to be 15:22  
11          disappointing and most concerning.

12  
13          It is clear, Chair, that Mr. O'Brien considers that his  
14          commitment, dedication and hours of hard work in an  
15          effort to deliver optimal, definitive and timely 15:22  
16          management of patients was undermined by a system where  
17          delivery was compromised by the lack of adequate  
18          sources and prioritisation. He contends that he was  
19          left without support to deal with the issues which  
20          arose. He has recalled the time when he met with 15:22  
21          Mr. Mackle, who was then Associate Medical Director,  
22          and Mrs. Corrigan, the Head of Service, on 30th March  
23          2016. He recalls asking what he was supposed to do to  
24          address issues such as triage and dictation. He claims  
25          that he was, yet again, left to deal with the problems 15:23  
26          alone and without any input, assistance, intervention,  
27          monitoring or supervision by line management or by the  
28          Trust.

1 He also contends that when the MHPS process was being  
2 instigated, his then clinical manager, Mr. Weir, was  
3 disconnected from the process and did not become  
4 involved in the decision-making. Mr. O'Brien has a  
5 number of concerns about the MHPS process and contends 15:23  
6 that the early communication with NCAS - and I'll turn  
7 to their role presently - was seriously misleading and  
8 that the case investigator failed to take account of  
9 the evidence which he provided to her. He was  
10 particularly aggrieved at what he regarded as her 15:24  
11 failure to ensure that a comparative analysis of NHS  
12 patients was conducted when she considered the  
13 allegation that he was responsible for advantaging  
14 private patients.

15  
16 Mr. O'Brien has expressed great unhappiness in relation 15:24  
17 to how his retirement from practice as a consultant  
18 urologist in the Southern Trust was forced upon him.  
19 He has recalled that while he had reached a decision in  
20 early 2020 to come out of full-time employment, he 15:24  
21 considered that he had the support of the clinical  
22 lead, Associate Medical Director and Head of Service to  
23 return to a part-time role with the Trust after a short  
24 break. He recalls that on 8th June 2020 he was told by  
25 Mr. Haynes and Mr. Carroll that he could not return on 15:24  
26 a part-time basis as the Trust had a practice of not  
27 reengaging people with ongoing HR processes. This, he  
28 said, came as a complete shock to him since he was  
29 committed to returning to work in order to positively

1 contribute to mitigating the risks associated with a  
2 beleaguered urology service.

3  
4 On 11th July 2020, Mr. O'Brien was made aware of  
5 concerns which had recently been identified with 15:25  
6 regards to his practice. Those concerns formed part of  
7 the early alert which was sent to the Department at the  
8 end of that month. In his statement to the Inquiry,  
9 Mr. O'Brien has expressed significant concern in  
10 relation to the information that was provided to the 15:25  
11 Minister and/or the Department of Health prior to the  
12 announcement of the Inquiry on 24th November 2020. He  
13 complains that the very trigger for what was an  
14 informal lookback exercise at first of all his patients  
15 to January 2019 was the totally untrue assertion - and 15:26  
16 that's his claim - in a letter of 11th July 2020 about  
17 two patients who had been placed on the patient  
18 administration system in the ordinary way and which he  
19 says any competent and impartial consideration of the  
20 medical records and correspondence held by the Trust 15:26  
21 would have revealed.

22  
23 The concerns relating to the administration of those  
24 two patients formed part of a number of concerns which  
25 the Trust considered from July 2020 and which were to 15:26  
26 lead to the identification of nine patients who met the  
27 threshold for SAI review and the establishment of an  
28 SCRR process. I will look at this in further detail  
29 shortly.

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Mr. O'Brien, however, has expressed his concern that he has not been afforded the opportunity to meaningfully contribute to either of these processes and with his legal representatives he has argued that this lack of engagement with him is grossly unfair and is likely to produce outcomes from both processes which are unreliable and inaccurate.

15:27

Mr. O'Brien has frequently voiced his deep concern with the urology service provided by the Trust. This has been reiterated most recently in his witness statement to the Inquiry where he argues that throughout his tenure, the greatest threat to the safety of urological patients was the inadequacy of the services provided by the Trust. He claims that this inadequacy has resulted in an unsafe service which resulted in increasing risks of serious harm to multiples of these patients. He contends that the Trust has failed to provide a urological service equitable to other specialist services which it has provided and that not only has it failed to address and resolve the concerns that its consultant urologists had for years, but has instead avoided and evaded sharing the responsibility for the clinical consequences, transferring that responsibility to the inadequate numbers of clinicians who have overworked beyond their contractual obligations to mitigate the risks of patients coming to harm.

15:27

15:27

15:28

15:28

1 Reflecting upon the impact on him personally,  
2 Mr. O'Brien maintains that these failures resulted in a  
3 relentless burden carried by him and his two few  
4 colleagues to maximally mitigate the risk of patients  
5 coming to harm due to that inadequacy. He says that he 15:29  
6 has worked far beyond any contractual obligations and  
7 that this has been acknowledged. He has worked when on  
8 leave and even when on sick leave. He says that he's  
9 tried to do the impossible but the impossible proved  
10 not to be possible, and he invites the Inquiry the 15:29  
11 consider that any failings on his part would be viewed  
12 in this light.

13  
14 I'm going to move on now to look at the Health and  
15 Social Care Board. 15:29

16  
17 Chair, as I have explained, part (b) of your Terms of  
18 Reference requires the Inquiry to consider the  
19 communication and escalation of the reporting of issues  
20 between the Trust and the Health and Social Care Board, 15:30  
21 the PHA and the Department of Health.

22  
23 The Inquiry is also empowered to consider any other  
24 areas which directly bear on patient care and safety.

25 15:30  
26 The Health and Social Care Board was established under  
27 Section 7 of the Health and Social Care (Reform) Act  
28 (Northern Ireland) 2009. It was dissolved with effect  
29 from 1st April this year. Absolutely no connection to

1 this Inquiry but it's dissolution occurred earlier this  
2 year and its functions transferred to the Department of  
3 Health's Strategic Planning and Performance Group, the  
4 SPPG, pursuant to Section 1 and Schedule 1 of the  
5 Health and Social Care Act (Northern Ireland) 2022. 15:31

6 The closure of the HSCB followed what Sharon Gallagher  
7 has described as a review of commissioning which  
8 concluded that the system was overly bureaucratic and  
9 complex. In anticipation of that closure,

10 Mrs. Gallagher took up a dual post as Chief Executive 15:31  
11 of the HSCB and Deputy Secretary of the Health Service  
12 Operations Group on 28th September 2020. She now leads  
13 the SPPG in her role as Deputy Secretary, and in that  
14 role she oversees the commissioning arrangements for  
15 health and social care for the Northern Ireland 15:31

16 population. She works closely with the Chief Executive  
17 of the PHA to ensure the delivery of an integrated  
18 health and social care commissioning plan for Northern  
19 Ireland. She has been a member of the Department-led  
20 Urology Assurance Group since its inception in late 15:32  
21 2020.

22  
23 Mrs. Gallagher has explained the functions and activity  
24 of the HSCB and now the SPPG and its relationship with  
25 the Department, the Trusts and the PHA in particular. 15:32  
26 The brief overview which I'm about to provide does not  
27 do justice to the detail and complexity of the account  
28 which she has provided. It is anticipated that the  
29 Inquiry will hear from Mrs. Gallagher in due course.

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She has explained that the HSCB was established to perform the following broad functions:

To arrange or commission a comprehensive range of modern and effective health and social services for the population of Northern Ireland, and to performance manage Health and Social Care Trusts that directly provide services to people to ensure that these achieve optimal quality and value for money in line with relevant government targets and within the budget envelope available.

15:33

15:33

Pursuant to Section 8 of the 2009 Act, the HSCB was required to produce an annual commissioning plan in response to the Department's commissioning plan direction and in full consultation and agreement with the PHA. Mrs. Gallagher has explained that this requirement is at the core of the key working relationship that translates the strategic objectives, priorities and standards set by the Department into a range of high-quality, accessible health and social care services and general improvement in public health and wellbeing.

15:33

15:33

Employees of the Health and Social Care Board and the PHA work in fully integrated, multidisciplinary teams to advance the commissioning process at regional and local levels.

15:34

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Mrs. Gallagher's response to the Inquiry acknowledges that the HSCB was for some time aware of service capacity issues within urology services generally and was focused on a strategic regional solution to those issues. She does not comment on or engage with the severity of those capacity issues and the impact on the Southern Trust, its staff or the population it serves, nor has she expressed a view on whether sufficient steps have been taken to mitigate these issues even allowing for resourcing constraints. She has explained, in some detail, the outworking of the 2009 regional review on urology services and has referred to the role of the Regional Urology Planning and Implementation Group which monitors demand and available capacity to help reduce variation in waiting times across the region. She has explained that work continues to be undertaken to expand urology services across the region within the resources available.

15:34

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15:35

As well as commissioning services, the HSCB's role was to engage with all of the Trusts in respect of performance management and service improvement. In order to discharge its performance management role, the HSCB scrutinised management reports and raised challenges where necessary. The HSCB's Director of Performance and Director of Commissioning met regularly with the Trusts at director level. The HSCB had available to it a range of escalation measures if

15:35



1 monitoring of performance identified concerns about a  
2 Trust performance or a serious risk to the achievement  
3 of targets. There is no suggestion that any escalation  
4 measure was applied to the Trust's urology service.

15:36

5  
6 The HSCB has, since 2009, monitored complaints,  
7 processes, outcomes and service improvements.  
8 Furthermore, pursuant to a departmental circular,  
9 8/2010, issued on 30th April 2010, Trusts were obliged  
10 routinely to report SAIs to the HSCB and now to the  
11 SPPG. The PHA work closely with the HSCB in this  
12 sphere. The previous arrangement had been for Trusts  
13 to make these reports on Serious Adverse Incidents to  
14 the Department.

15:36

15  
16 At Section 7 of her response, Mrs. Gallagher has  
17 helpfully described the SAI process, its importance  
18 generally and the role of the HSCB in that context. As  
19 part of its performance management function, the HSCB  
20 engaged with the Trusts to assess final SAI reports to  
21 ensure that any review had been sufficiently robust and  
22 gave consideration to regional learning. The HSCB was  
23 not involved in SAI investigations per se.

15:37

15:37

24  
25 Mrs. Gallagher has observed that delays in compliance  
26 with SAIs have been prevalent for some time and an  
27 improvement plan was introduced by the HSCB as recently  
28 as February 2021. She has also explained the  
29 engagement between the HSCB and the Southern Trust in

15:37

1 relation to the three Serious Adverse Incident reviews  
2 involving urology services in the Trust which emerged  
3 in or about 2016 when nine SAI reviews involving  
4 urology services in the Trust which emerged in 2020  
5 were the subject of a paper which was discussed by the 15:38  
6 HSCB senior management team in June 2021.

7  
8 As I have just explained, the Inquiry must explore the  
9 communication and escalation of the reporting of issues  
10 between the Trust and the HSCB, the HPA and the 15:38  
11 Department. Mrs. Gallagher has emphasised that the SAI  
12 review process is not designed to identify errant  
13 practice at the level of the individual practitioner.  
14 Therefore, the HSCB was not alerted to the Trust's  
15 concerns regarding Mr. O'Brien's practice until they 15:39  
16 were specifically notified by the Trust through the  
17 early alert process in 2020.

18  
19 Mrs. Gallagher has expressly commented that there is no  
20 record within the HSCB to indicate any awareness of the 15:39  
21 issues relating to Mr. O'Brien prior to 31st July 2020  
22 and its focus prior to that date was not on the  
23 specific practice of any individual consultant team or  
24 hospital. She has added that no pattern/trends of  
25 concern or clusters of complaint were identified to the 15:39  
26 HSCB with regards to the urology services at the Trust  
27 or the practice of Mr. O'Brien.

28  
29 The Inquiry is interested in the capacity issues which

1 were a constant presence during the relevant timeframe  
2 and will wish to explore with the former HSCB whether  
3 there was any concern that those issues and the  
4 pressures they created could have impacted on the safe  
5 delivery of care, even if that concern was not formally 15:40  
6 communicated and escalated. The quality of the  
7 communication between the HSCB and the Trust and the  
8 sensitivity of the former's performance management  
9 function will fall to be considered as the Inquiry  
10 progresses. 15:40

11  
12 Finally in this section looking at the Core  
13 Participants and the other bodies and people named in  
14 our Terms of Reference, I look at the PHA, the Public  
15 Health Agency. 15:41

16  
17 As I have mentioned, the Inquiry's Terms of Reference  
18 in part (b) engage looking at the communication between  
19 the Public Health Agency and the Trust.

20 15:41  
21 I will introduce the Inquiry to the role of the PHA by  
22 providing a brief overview of its functions and its  
23 relationship with the other public bodies that the  
24 Inquiry is concerned with.

25 15:41  
26 Like the HSCB and now the SPPG, the PHA is a statutory  
27 body. It came into existence on 1st April 2009. As a  
28 statutory body, the agency has specific powers to act  
29 as a regulator to contract in its own name and to act

1 as a corporate trustee. The PHA's senior leadership  
2 team is structured around the Chief Executive and four  
3 directors who are supported by 13 assistant directors.  
4 The current Chief Executive is Mr. Aidan Dawson who has  
5 kindly assisted the Inquiry by providing a witness 15:42  
6 statement. In his statement, Mr. Dawson has explained  
7 that the PHA has three primary functions: Improvement  
8 in health and social wellbeing, health protection and  
9 service development. He has indicated that working  
10 with the HSCB, the PHA has an important role to play in 15:42  
11 providing professional leadership to the HSCB sector.  
12 More generally, in discharging these functions, the PHA  
13 has a responsibility for promoting improved partnership  
14 between the health and social care sector and local  
15 government, other public sector organisations and the 15:42  
16 voluntary and community sectors to bring about  
17 improvements in public health and social wellbeing and  
18 for anticipating the new opportunities offered by  
19 community planning.

20  
21 Quite apart from the statutory descriptions of its  
22 functions, the PHA is also the recipient of  
23 instructions and guidance from the Department.  
24 Mr. Dawson has drawn the Inquiry's attention to an  
25 important example of such instruction, namely the 15:43  
26 Department's framework document which you have heard  
27 something about already. Mr. Dawson has addressed the  
28 relationship between the PHA and the other bodies that  
29 the Inquiry is particularly concerned about within part

1 (b). I will briefly summarise the position but the  
2 detail is to be found in Mr. Dawson's response.

3  
4 Firstly, the Department. The PHA is required to report  
5 regularly to its departmental sponsor branch to provide 15:43  
6 assurance on a range of governance areas, including  
7 roles and responsibilities, business planning and risk  
8 management, governance and internal audit. I have  
9 already touched upon aspects of the dual approach  
10 necessarily adopted by the PHA and the HSCB given the 15:43  
11 overlapping nature of their interests and functions.  
12 Not only does the HSCB and PHA work together to provide  
13 professional leadership to the health and social care  
14 sector, but they also work closely on commissioning  
15 matters. For example, HSCB is required to prepare and 15:44  
16 publish a commissioning plan in full consultation with  
17 and with the approval of the PHA each financial year.

18  
19 Mr. Dawson explains that the HSCB and PHA also  
20 collaborate in supporting providers to improve 15:44  
21 performance and achieve desired outcomes.

22  
23 The HSCB is the lead organisation for supporting  
24 providers in relation to the delivery of a wide range  
25 of health and social care services and outcomes but 15:44  
26 this work is supported using the professional staff of  
27 the PHA.

28  
29 PHA, in turn, is the lead organisation for supporting

1 providers in the areas of health improvement,  
2 screening, and health protection within the support  
3 provided by the performance commissioning, finance,  
4 primary and social care staff of the HSCB. The  
5 resolution of any provider performance issues is a  
6 matter for the HSCB in close cooperation with the PHA  
7 escalating to the Department only if required.

15:45

8  
9 Mr. Dawson's description you may think helpfully  
10 illustrates the close relationship between those two  
11 public bodies.

15:45

12  
13 Mr. Dawson has indicated that from 2009 the role of  
14 staff who were previously employed in the Southern  
15 Health and Social Services Board and who moved to the  
16 PHA with the formation of the new organisation was to  
17 change. Since 2009 there has been a much greater  
18 emphasis on regional commissioning issues with the  
19 result, he says, that there has been more limited  
20 opportunity for direct engagement with clinicians or  
21 service managers at Trust level in respect of  
22 individual specialities or performance management.

15:46

15:46

23  
24 The Inquiry may wish to consider whether that has  
25 created any sense of disconnect in relation to the  
26 problems that might be felt in terms of service  
27 delivery on the ground.

15:46

28  
29 Mr. Dawson has explained the PHA's involvement with the

1 regional urology service issues. He has advised that  
2 PHA staff participate, as required, in regional working  
3 groups. For example, its staff were involved in the  
4 working group concerning the regional review of urology  
5 services. Moreover, PHA staff are members of the  
6 Northern Ireland Cancer Network or NICaN. PHA staff  
7 members are not members of the urology clinical  
8 reference group of NICaN but as with other clinical  
9 reference groups, they may attend by invitation to  
10 discuss particular topics of concern.

15:47

15:47

11  
12 One of the Inquiry's particular interest is the process  
13 for reviewing Serious Adverse Incidents. Mr. Dawson  
14 has addressed this area in considerable detail in his  
15 Section 21 response to the Inquiry. He has indicated  
16 that the process which is generally followed is for the  
17 Trust to notify the HSCB governance team of the  
18 incident. Once received, these notifications are  
19 allocated, as appropriate, to either a professional  
20 group in the case of a Level 1 SAI, or a designated  
21 review officer in the case of a Level 2 or Level 3 SAI.  
22 These professionals may be medical, nursing or allied  
23 health professionals from the PHA or social care or  
24 primary care professionals from HSCB. Mr. Dawson  
25 indicates that the PHA does not have a governance lead  
26 for SAI. That role is provided by the HSCB.

15:47

15:48

15:48

27  
28 Mr. Dawson has outlined the activity which the PHA has  
29 engaged in concerning specific SAIs which are of

1 interest to this Inquiry. He has explained that in the  
2 case of Patient 95 - and I should pause at this point  
3 to remind the Core Participants and indeed yourself,  
4 Chair, that there's an appendix setting out a cipher  
5 list for all of the patients that we are concerned 15:49  
6 with. So he has explained that in the case of Patient  
7 95, for example, which I will examine in somewhat  
8 greater detail later, the designated review officer,  
9 Dr. Corrigan, was dissatisfied with the recommendations  
10 which emerged from the Trust's SAI Review. The SAI 15:49  
11 recommendations failed to engage with the fact that the  
12 consultant concerned, Mr. O'Brien, had failed to review  
13 the results of a CT scan as soon as those results were  
14 available in the case of a retained swab. Dr. Corrigan  
15 expressed her concerns to the Trust and asked for this 15:50  
16 issue to be addressed. Whether the issue was  
17 satisfactorily addressed is an issue of concern or  
18 interest for the Inquiry.

19  
20 Incidentally, it is of note that at or about that time 15:50  
21 in 2010/11, Dr. Corrigan was also engaged in  
22 discussions with the Trust about the use of intravenous  
23 antibiotic therapy in benign cystectomy procedures.  
24 Both issues also involve Mr. O'Brien, however the SAI  
25 report concerning Patient 95 did not identify the 15:50  
26 clinicians involved and it may be that she did not  
27 appreciate that Mr. O'Brien was involved in both  
28 issues.

29



1 Mr. Dawson has also referred the Inquiry to particular  
2 engagement between the PHA and the Trust in order to  
3 discuss what he has called a cluster of three SAIs  
4 relating to urology services and mainly related to  
5 triage issues. The designated review officer for those 15:51  
6 cases was a Dr. McLean. She made contact with the  
7 Trust's Medical Director, Dr. Richard Wright, on 27th  
8 September 2017. She invited Dr. Wright to explain  
9 whether the issue in these triage cases had arisen  
10 because of a problem with an individual's practice or 15:51  
11 whether it was a systems issue in urology. She was  
12 advised by Dr. Wright that the problem was with an  
13 individual doctor, whom he named as Mr. O'Brien, who  
14 was the subject of restrictions and was being managed  
15 under the MHPS process. Dr. McLean e-mailed the 15:51  
16 Director of Public Health and other senior staff to  
17 summarise the conversation with Dr. Wright but did not  
18 name the doctor involved as the identity was not  
19 relevant to the PHA.

20 15:52  
21 Mr. Dawson highlights that the SAI process anonymises  
22 clinicians. He also places emphasis on that part of  
23 the SAI procedure which addresses the reporting and  
24 follow-up of SAI review and which directs the SAI  
25 review team to be aware of the distinction between SAI 15:52  
26 reviews which are solely for identification and  
27 reporting learning points and disciplinary, regulatory  
28 or criminal processes. He also highlights that the PHA  
29 do not have a role in the management of individual

1 doctors employed by the Trust and nor does it have a  
2 role in the MHPS process.

3  
4 Dr. Dawson has explained that as a result of Covid,  
5 changes have been made to the SAI process which will 15:53  
6 remain in situ as they have been found to provide a  
7 better oversight and allow for improved detection of  
8 themes or trends. However, he argues that the process  
9 of SAI review is not intended to detect individual  
10 clinical shortcomings. He says: 15:53

11  
12 "The aim of the SAI process is to provide a mechanism  
13 to effectively share learning in a meaningful way with  
14 a focus on safety and quality, ultimately leading to  
15 service improvement for service users. It was not 15:53  
16 designed as a measure to address the types of patient  
17 safety and clinical issues and clinical issues  
18 identified within the urology service in the Southern  
19 Trust. It follows that the PHA does not regard the SAI  
20 process as an effective measure to address concerns 15:54  
21 relating to errant practice on the part of individual  
22 practitioners."

23  
24 Mr. Dawson has indicated that the other matters of  
25 concern relating to Mr. O'Brien which were examined as 15:54  
26 part of the MHPS process, and here he refers to  
27 patients notes tracked out to Mr. O'Brien and not  
28 returned, undictated patient outcomes from outpatient  
29 clinics, and the alleged preferential scheduling of

1 private patients were not brought to the attention of  
2 the PHA until the early alert was received in the  
3 summer of 2020.

4  
5 The nature and extent of the communication between the 15:54  
6 PHA and the Trust is of interest to the Inquiry. It is  
7 clear that at various points the PHA engaged with the  
8 Trust on issues of concern arising out of the practice  
9 of Mr. O'Brien but that it may not have linked those  
10 issues together and did not in any event contemplate 15:55  
11 for itself a role in managing the performance of an  
12 individual clinician. The Inquiry will wish to  
13 consider the soundness of that position.

14  
15 I'm going to move, Chair, to spend just ten minutes 15:55  
16 opening Part 2 of the opening statement just to  
17 introduce it. We've lost some time earlier today and I  
18 want to make hay while the sun is shining in my eyes.  
19 So I will aim to finish by about five or ten past.

20 CHAIR: So if anybody has any difficulty with that, if 15:55  
21 they need to leave sooner than, please feel free but  
22 just to be clear, my intention will be to sit certainly  
23 until about half past four each day.

24 MR. WOLFE KC: Part 2 of this opening statement  
25 concerns clinical aspects and patient impact. 15:56  
26

27 Madam Chair, I will now turn to consider aspects of the  
28 issues which fall within paragraphs (c) and (d) of the  
29 Inquiry's Terms of Reference and what the Inquiry's

1 work to date has revealed about the clinical  
2 shortcomings which have been reported in respect of  
3 Mr. O'Brien's practice. I will commence by recapping  
4 on the evidence received by the Inquiry from patients  
5 of the Trust urology service. I then propose to 15:56  
6 highlight the findings of the SAI and the SEA reviews  
7 which have been conducted within the Trust in respect  
8 of care provided to 19 patients of Mr. O'Brien. As I  
9 indicated earlier, the SAI review in respect of the  
10 20th patient is still under consideration as it was 15:57  
11 only drawn to our attention yesterday and so I will not  
12 address it here.

13  
14 These reviews were important exercises in which various  
15 review teams documented significant and repeated 15:57  
16 clinical and governance failings over a prolonged  
17 period of time. I will also refer to the  
18 recommendations that flowed from those reviews and  
19 while it might be suggested that those recommendations  
20 were not always comprehensive, the Inquiry may consider 15:57  
21 that they at least provided an opportunity to stimulate  
22 improvement and reform.

23  
24 I will point out the kinds of governance concerns which  
25 arise from those reviews for the Inquiry's 15:57  
26 consideration. I will also refer to the emerging  
27 findings of the Trust's lookback review and SCRR  
28 exercises which have been initiated since Mr. O'Brien's  
29 retirement in 2020. Those processes have enabled the

1 Trust to identify those patients whose care was  
2 suboptimal or was of concern and in some cases  
3 different care treatments options have been proposed  
4 and implemented.

5  
6 Those preliminary findings will be examined alongside  
7 the conclusions which have been reached following two  
8 recent reviews. The first of those reviews carried out  
9 by the RQIA identifies a number of shortcomings in the  
10 SCRR process to date. The second review conducted by  
11 the Royal College of Surgeons examined a small sample  
12 of Mr. O'Brien's patients from 2015 and identifies  
13 concerns in the delivery of urological services across  
14 a range of issues. On the basis of both reviews, it is  
15 understood that the Trust is considering whether to  
16 extend the scope of its lookback review.

17  
18 I will examine other indications of concern about  
19 clinical issues arising out of cases which have not  
20 been considered in any SAI or SCRR process.

21  
22 It appears on the basis of the evidence received to  
23 date that mere consideration of the SCRR or SAI cases  
24 in an effort to achieve an accurate count of the number  
25 of Serious Adverse Incidents is unlikely to prove  
26 reliable. It is quite possible that there has been a  
27 degree of underreporting. If we simply focus on the  
28 official count, it can be said that the Trust has so  
29 far identified 73 patients, that is 20 patients who

1 have had an SAI or a sub species of SAI called SEA, in  
2 the period since 2010; 53 who are being considered in  
3 the SCRR process, whose care or an aspect of whose care  
4 under Mr. O'Brien has met the threshold for Serious  
5 Adverse Incident. 16:00

6 As you know, Chair, the Inquiry is obliged to examine  
7 the clinical aspects of those cases for the purposes  
8 set out in part (c) of your Terms of Reference.

9  
10 Taking the paragraphs of your Terms of Reference out of 16:00  
11 their natural order, I will start with part (d) which  
12 provides that the Inquiry is to afford those patients  
13 affected, and/or their immediate families, an  
14 opportunity to report their experiences to the Inquiry.

15 16:00  
16 If patients feel that they have been adversely affected  
17 by their engagement with the Trust, it is important  
18 that this Inquiry hears about that adverse affect and  
19 its consequences. In seeking to give effect to part  
20 (d), the Inquiry has undertaken a process of patient 16:00  
21 engagement and that patient engagement has involved the  
22 use of the patient questionnaire and I've referred  
23 earlier to the fact that to date 14 completed  
24 questionnaires have been received from affected  
25 patients and families. In addition to those completed 16:01  
26 questionnaires, the Inquiry has also received  
27 correspondence from other patients.

28  
29 In those communications with the Inquiry, patients have

1 shared their experiences of using and accessing urology  
2 services in the Trust. A number of themes can be  
3 discerned from those questionnaires to date: Two  
4 patients experienced delays in the removal of urinary  
5 stents; several patients raised issues about poor 16:01  
6 communication; a number of patients described issues  
7 with delay; and one referred to the inappropriate  
8 prescription of low-dose Bicalutamide.

9  
10 Madam Chair, it is important I think that I should 16:02  
11 reflect that the positive reports from patients in  
12 respect of their treatment by Mr. O'Brien in particular  
13 have been provided to the Inquiry. In the words of  
14 some of those former patients, "Mr. O'Brien has been  
15 attentive, totally professional" and some have 16:02  
16 expressed to the Inquiry that the care and treatment  
17 that they have received from him was "of a high  
18 standard" and "second to none".

19  
20 A further aspect of engagement with patient and/or 16:02  
21 their families has involved contact with the Patient  
22 and Client Council or the PCC, another arm's length  
23 body established under the 2009 Reform Act. The  
24 Inquiry has explained to that organisation the role of  
25 the Inquiry and invited it to promote awareness of the 16:02  
26 Inquiry's work with patients and their families and the  
27 public generally.

28  
29 At this juncture I would emphasise for the benefit of

1 any members of the public following along today that  
2 the Inquiry continues to actively invite and welcome  
3 engagement from any patients or immediate family  
4 members who wish to report their experiences. As I  
5 have mentioned, the questionnaire is available on the 16:03  
6 Inquiry's website or, in the alternative, can be  
7 requested from the Inquiry by telephone.

8  
9 I want to recap, members of the Inquiry, albeit  
10 briefly, on the information or evidence you received 16:03  
11 during the private patient hearings.

12  
13 Chair, you made the point correctly this morning that a  
14 full record of those hearings is available by  
15 transcript but I think given that this is the first 16:03  
16 opportunity to reflect publicly the experiences of  
17 those patients, I will briefly set out what you were  
18 told.

19  
20 The purpose of those hearings which took place in June 16:04  
21 and September of this year was to give effect to part  
22 (d) of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. The Inquiry  
23 heard from eight patients and families. The names of  
24 those patients cannot be given publicly, although each  
25 of the Core Participants are aware of their identities. 16:04  
26 Instead I will refer to them using the Inquiry's  
27 cipher, and the media is required to use these cipher  
28 in any reportage of these matters and must not under  
29 any circumstances identify the patients or their family



1 members.

2

3 The patient evidence:

4 For the purposes of this opening statement, I will  
5 provide a brief summary of the issues raised by the  
6 patient or family member when they came to give  
7 evidence to the Inquiry as follows:

16:04

8

9 Patient 18 gave evidence to the effect that there had  
10 been no discussion of treatment options with him and  
11 that Mr. O'Brien had effectively dissuaded him from  
12 pursuing radiotherapy, instead prescribing low-dose  
13 Bicalutamide. Patient 18 was only offered radiotherapy  
14 after he had written to Mr. O'Brien requesting same in  
15 very clear terms. Patient 18 explained that he had not  
16 been assigned a cancer nurse specialist and felt he was  
17 unable to make an informed decision about his  
18 treatment. The care afforded to Patient 18 has been  
19 the subject of an SCRR report which pointed to a  
20 failure to comply with the multidisciplinary meeting  
21 consensus resulting in delayed referral for  
22 radiotherapy and criticised the use of Bicalutamide.

16:05

16:05

16:05

23

24 Patient 16's daughter described the significant  
25 difficulties with communication which she and her  
26 family experienced when dealing with urology.

16:06

27 Ultimately this prompted a complaint to the Trust as  
28 well as to the Public Service Ombudsman such was the  
29 level of frustration and concern. The delay in

1 removing her father's stent meant that radiotherapy was  
2 no longer an option in treating his prostate cancer.  
3 This patient's case was the subject of an SAI review  
4 which I will discuss later. Patient 16's daughter told  
5 the Inquiry that the SAI process had never been 16:06  
6 explained to the family and that they had to rely on  
7 the Patient Client Council for support.

8  
9 Patient 10's husband explained that there had been a  
10 64-week delay in his wife's case "because of a failure 16:06  
11 to triage her referral". He described his and his  
12 wife's shock and concern at discovering that her case  
13 was not the only case where Mr. O'Brien had failed to  
14 triage whilst he was urologist of the week. This case  
15 was the subject of a SAI review. Patient 10's husband 16:07  
16 raised issues around the adequacy of the Trust's  
17 communication in respect of the SAI process telling the  
18 Inquiry that there had been no communication from the  
19 Trust until the report had been finished. He told the  
20 Inquiry that neither here nor his wife were aware that 16:07  
21 an SAI report was being compiled before then.

22  
23 Patient 84 told the Inquiry about the difficulty he  
24 experienced when trying to contact Mr. O'Brien with  
25 regard to delay in removing his urinary stent. He felt 16:07  
26 he had been, in his words, "fobbed off" by  
27 administrative staff and despite trying ten times, he  
28 never managed to get speaking to Mr. O'Brien. He was  
29 left disappointed and annoyed with the outcome.

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29

Patient 13 explained to the Inquiry that he felt that he had not been given much information. Patient 13 explained that he first became aware that there been a delay in processing his GP referral in February 2018 despite that referral having been made in July 2016. He recalled receiving a telephone call to inform him that a newspaper article was due to be published in the Irish News and to reassure him that his care had been appropriate. His care was one of the five cases considered together as part of a single SAI review which in common with the SAI review of Patient 10's care focused on the failures of triaging within urology services.

16:08  
  
16:08

Patient 15's son conveyed his frustration at the lack of communication and information forthcoming from the Trust to his family in respect of his father's care. He recounted to the Inquiry the impact of the six-month delay in receiving treatment had on his father's health. He described having first been informed that there were potential issues with his father's care in May 2021 during a telephone call from Mr. Haynes. Patient 15's son was very clear in his evidence that the purpose of that phone call was to advise the family that there would be an article published in the Irish News. It was his evidence that the family did not come away from that phone call with an understanding that there had been an SAI review of his father's care.

16:08  
  
16:09  
  
16:09

1 Indeed Patient 15's son indicated that the SAI review  
2 report was first shared with the family by this  
3 Inquiry.

4 Patient 35's son described how his father had been  
5 prescribed low-dose Bicalutamide and managed by way of 16:10  
6 active surveillance as opposed to having been offered  
7 radical treatment. He explained to the Inquiry that  
8 when his father suffered a recurrence of cancer, the  
9 seriousness of his illness had been downplayed by  
10 Mr. O'Brien and described the family's shock in 16:10  
11 learning that his father was to be managed  
12 palliatively. The care afforded to Patient 35 has also  
13 been the subject of an SCRR and Patient 35 and his  
14 mother have met with the Trust to discuss the review's  
15 findings. Those findings showed that the management of 16:10  
16 Patient 35's cancer treatment fell well below what was  
17 expected and that while it was difficult to quantify  
18 the precise impact on prognosis, the delay reduced the  
19 chance of curative radiotherapy being successful.

20  
21 Finally, Patient 1's daughter also gave evidence 16:11  
22 suggesting that the seriousness of Patient 1's illness  
23 had not been fully explained to Patient 1 or his  
24 family. She described the side effects her father had  
25 experienced as a result of taking Bicalutamide. She 16:11  
26 explained that her father had never been allocated a  
27 cancer nurse specialist and described the significant  
28 challenges the family faced in caring for Patient 1  
29 without support during the Covid-19 pandemic. Patient

1 1's daughter also described having received a telephone  
2 call from the Trust in advance of the publication of an  
3 article in the Irish News relating to urology. Patient  
4 1's daughter also gave evidence that following her  
5 father's death, Mr. O'Brien made a telephone call in 16:11  
6 which he sought to assure with the family that all  
7 appropriate care had been given. In the questionnaire  
8 submitted to the Inquiry by Patient 1's family, they  
9 described the impact of the shortcomings in his care  
10 explaining that Patient 1 felt that he had been thrown 16:12  
11 under a bus by the healthcare system. The care  
12 afforded to Patient 1 was the subject of an SAI review  
13 and the Trust met with the family to discuss its  
14 findings.

15  
16 So, Chair, eight families or eight patients, a small  
17 number of patient testimonies perhaps, but each one  
18 tells a story about how the urology service has let  
19 them down. Each of those patients or their family  
20 members have provided valuable evidence about their 16:12  
21 experiences which has helped to contextualise the  
22 impact of clinical shortcomings and to provide an  
23 insight into their often traumatic experiences.

24  
25 There is a close connection between part (d) and part 16:13  
26 (c) of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. By hearing  
27 from patients about their experiences when accessing  
28 urology services, the Inquiry is enabled to better  
29 understand the clinical aspects of their cases.

1 Further patient hearings, as you've said, are planned  
2 for early next year. It is anticipated that the  
3 Inquiry will continue to convene such hearings  
4 periodically at convenient points in the Inquiry's  
5 process if the need arises.

16:13

6  
7 Tomorrow morning, if this is a convenient time, I will  
8 take up what is perhaps the longest section of the  
9 opening, thanks to Ms. Treanor, who contributed  
10 significantly to it, and I imagine that will take us  
11 through the large part of the morning and perhaps into  
12 the afternoon.

16:13

13 CHAIR: Thank you very much, Mr. Wolfe. Well, ladies  
14 and gentlemen, that concludes the first public sitting  
15 of the Inquiry. We will resume again tomorrow morning  
16 at 10:00 a.m. so if everyone can convene for that time  
17 please.

16:14

18  
19 THE INQUIRY WAS THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL WEDNESDAY,  
20 9TH NOVEMBER 2022 AT 10:00 A.M.

16:14